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Abstract Coalitionformationisacentralprobleminmultiagentsystemsresearch,butmost
models assume common knowledge of agent types. In practice, however, agents are often
unsure of the types or capabilities of their potential partners, but gain information about
these capabilities through repeated interaction. In this paper, we propose a novel Bayesian,
model-based reinforcement learning framework for this problem, assuming that coalitions
are formed (and tasks undertaken) repeatedly. Our model allows agents to reﬁne their beliefs
about the types of others as they interact within a coalition. The model also allows agents to
make explicit tradeoffs between exploration (forming “new” coalitions to learn more about
the types of new potential partners) and exploitation (relying on partners about which more
is known), using value of information to deﬁne optimal exploration policies. Our framework
effectively integrates decision making during repeated coalition formation under type uncer-
tainty with Bayesian reinforcement learning techniques. Specifically, we present several
learning algorithms to approximate the optimal Bayesian solution to the repeated coalition
formation and type-learning problem, providing tractable means to ensure good sequential
performance. We evaluate our algorithms in a variety of settings, showing that one method
in particular exhibits consistently good performance in practice. We also demonstrate the
ability of our model to facilitate knowledge transfer across different dynamic tasks.
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1 Introduction
Coalition formation, widely studied in game theory and economics [3, 31, 35, 38, 45, 50],
has attracted much attention in AI as means of dynamically forming partnerships or teams
of cooperating agents [32–34, 48, 52]. Most models of coalition formation assume that the
values of potential coalitions are known with certainty, implying that agents possess knowl-
edgeofthecapabilitiesoftheirpotentialpartners.However,inmanynaturalsettings,rational
agentsmustformcoalitionsanddividethegeneratedvaluewithoutknowingaprioriwhatthis
value may be or how suitable their potential partners are for the task at hand. In other cases,
it is assumed that this knowledge can be reached via communication [51, 52]; but without
strong mechanisms or contract conditions, agents usually have incentives to lie about (e.g.,
exaggerate) their capabilities to potential partners.
Thepresenceofuncertaintypresentsopportunitiesforagentstolearnaboutthecapabilities
of their partners if they interact repeatedly. The effects of collective actions provide valu-
ableinformationaboutthecapabilitiesofone’scoalitionalpartners.Thisinformationshould,
naturally, impact future coalition formation decisions and choice of coalitional actions, thus
reﬁning how coalitions are formed over time. For example, extremely capable agents may
ﬁnd themselves in greater demand as their capabilities become known with greater certainty;
and they may, over time, also be able to extract a larger share of the surplus generated by the
coalitions in which they participate.
Examplesofcoalitionformationundersuchuncertaintyabound.Thecaseofanenterprise
trying to choose subcontractors (e.g., for building projects) while unsure of their capabilities
and synergies is one such example. As projects are completed, information gleaned from
the outcomes allows for reﬁned assessment of the capabilities and value that speciﬁc sub-
contractors bring to the table, which in turn inﬂuences decisions regarding future project
participation. The creation and interaction of virtual organizations has long been anticipated
as a target of agent coalition technologies within e-commerce. While virtual organizations
willallowinstitutionstocometogetherdynamicallytoshareresourcesandcoordinateactions
to accomplish common (or partially aligned) objectives, this cannot happen without some
means of establishing coalitional terms under type uncertainty. We expect past experiences
to inﬂuence the formation of future organizations, allowing institutions to select partners
dynamically and switch allegiances as appropriate.
Realistic models of coalition formation must be able to deal with both uncertainty regard-
ing the effects of potential coalitional actions and the capabilities of the potential partners.
This uncertainty is translated into uncertainty about the values of various coalitions. In addi-
tion, learning mechanisms must be assumed to capture the fact that uncertainty is typically
reduced as agents gain experience with one another. Finally, these models should reﬂect the
fact that agents must make decisions about which coalitions to form, and which actions to
take, knowing that information gained though the course of coalitional interaction will inﬂu-
encefuturedecisions.Researchincoalitionformationtodatehasnotdealtwiththesequential
decision making problem facing agents forming coalitions under such type uncertainty. To
this end, we develop a model of sequential coalition formation under uncertainty that allows
agents to take sequentially rational decisions regarding which coalitions to form and which
coalitional actions to take. In our model, the value of a coalition is assumed to be a function
of the types of its participants, where types can be viewed loosely as reﬂecting any relevant
capabilities and qualities of team members.
As an illustrative example, consider a group of contractors, say plumbers, electricians,
andcarpenters,eachpossessingtrade-speciﬁcskillsofvariousdegreescorrespondingtotheir
types; e.g., a carpenter might be highly skilled or moderately incompetent. The contractors
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repeatedly come together to collaborate on various construction projects. Any group of con-
tractors that joins together to form a coalition will receive a payoff for the house they build.
Thepayoffforreceivedforahousedependsonthetypeofprojectundertakenanditsresulting
quality, which in turn depends on the quality of each team member and potential synergies
or conﬂicts among them. We assume that agents are uncertain about the types of potential
partners, but that their beliefs are used to determine a distribution over coalitional outcomes
and expected coalitional value. It is these beliefs that inﬂuence the coalition formation pro-
cess and the stability of any coalition structure that results. Each coalition must also decide
which collective action to take. For instance, a team of contractors may have a choice of
what type of housing project to undertake (e.g., a high-rise in Toronto or a townhouse estate
in Southampton). The outcome of such coalitional actions is stochastic, but is inﬂuenced by
the types of agents in the coalition. This too plays a key role in determination of coalition
value. Deliberations about team formation are complicated by the fact that uncertainty about
partner types inﬂuences coalitional actions decisions (e.g., what type of house to build) and
payoffdivision(e.g.,howtosplittherevenuegenerated).Ourmodelcanincorporateavariety
of (say, negotiation or equilibrium-based) mechanisms for determining coalitional stability,
value, and agent bargaining/payoff division.
In our model, agents come together repeatedly in episodes, during which they can form
new coalitions and take coalitional actions. In our construction example, for instance, after
one set of housing projects is completed, the agents have an opportunity to regroup, forming
new teams. Of course, the outcomes of previous coalitional actions provide each agent with
information about the types of its previous partners. In our example, receiving a high price
for a house may indicate to a plumber that the electrician and carpenter she partnered with
were highly competent. Agents update their beliefs about their partners based on those prior
outcomes and use these updated beliefs in their future coalitional deliberations. For example,
an agent may decide to abandon its current partners to join a new group that she believes may
be more profitable.
We propose a Bayesian reinforcement learning (RL) model that enables agents to make
better decisions regarding coalition formation, coalitional action, and bargaining using expe-
rience gained by these repeated interaction with others. The critical exploration–exploitation
tradeoff in RL is embodied in the tension between forming teams with partners about which
types are known with a high degree of certainty (e.g., stay in one’s current coalition) or
forming teams with partners about whom much less in known in order to learn more about
these new partners’ abilities. Our Bayesian RL model allows this tradeoff to be made opti-
mally by relying on the concept of value of information. We develop a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP) formulation of our Bayesian RL model. The solution of
this POMDP determines agent policies that value actions not just for their immediate gains,
but also because of the information they provide about the types of others and the values of
potential coalitions.
Since the solution of POMDPs is computationally intractable, we develop several com-
putational approximations to allow for the more effective construction of sequential policies.
We investigate these approximations experimentally and show that our framework enables
agents tomake informed, rationaldecisions aboutcoalition formation and coalitionalactions
that are rewarding in both the short and long term. This is true even if agents do not con-
verge to “stable” coalitions in the end of a series of coalition formation episodes. We also
demonstrate that our model allows for effective transfer of knowledge between tasks: agents
that learn about their partners’s abilities are able to re-use this knowledge when encountering
those partners in different circumstances.
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This paper focuses on the online behaviour of agents that learn by observing the results of
coalitional actions, that is, actions that are agreed upon during coalition formation episodes
and executed upon such an episode’s completion. We do not focus here on the negotiation
processes that determine the coalitions formed in each episode, nor on the strategic consider-
ations of agents during bargaining. However, our Bayesian RL model is fully general, and it
allows for the incorporation of any potential bargaining process that might be used to deter-
mine coalitional structure in each episode. For this reason, we do not model or analyze agent
behaviour during the repeated interaction as a game. Indeed, our repeated coalition forma-
tion problem under uncertainty could formally be modeled as an inﬁnite-horizon Bayesian
extensive form game (BEFG), in which the coalitional negotiations among agents at each
episode are explicitly modelled. An appropriate solution concept for such a game is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) [36], in which agents adopt behavioural strategies that are opti-
malatallsubgameswithrespecttotheirownbeliefsandthestrategiesadoptedbyopponents,
and beliefs are determined by Bayesian updates with respect to these behavioural strategies.
Unfortunately, due to the size of the beliefs/strategies space, obtaining a PBE solution is
a practically infeasible task [13]. The POMDP approximation methods we propose in this
work can be viewed as heuristic approximations of the solution of the corresponding BEFG
(though this comes without any bounds or guarantees regarding the PBE-optimality of an
agent’s policy). We elaborate on these issues later in the paper.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin with a brief review of coalition formation
and Bayesian reinforcement learning in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3 we describe a generic Bayesian
coalition formation model, detail our Bayesian RL framework for optimal repeated coalition
formation under uncertainty, and describe its POMDP formulation. We also motivate the
use of this approximation to the strategic behaviour that arise in a Bayesian extensive form
gameformulation.InSect.4wepresentseveralBayesianRLalgorithmsthatapproximatethe
solution of the POMDP, and in Sect. 5 explain how our RL algorithms can be combined with
different negotiation processes for coalition formation. We evaluate our algorithms experi-
mentally in Sect. 6 and compare our approach with related work in Sect. 7. We conclude in
Sect. 8 with a summary and discussion of future directions. Earlier versions of some aspects
of this research were presented in [12, 14].
2 Background
We begin with background on coalition formation and Bayesian reinforcement learning.
A deeper discussion of related work is found in Sect. 7.
2.1 Coalition formation
Cooperative game theory deals with situations where players act together in a cooperative
equilibrium selection process involving some form of bargaining, negotiation, or arbitration
[38]. The problem of coalition formation is one of the fundamental areas of study within
cooperative game theory.
Let N ={ 1,...,n},n > 2, be a set of players (or “agents”). A subset C   N is called a
coalition,andweassumethatagentsparticipatinginacoalitionwillcoordinatetheiractivities
for mutual beneﬁt.1 A coalition structure (CS) is a partition of the set of agents containing
exhaustive and disjoint coalitions. Coalition formation is the process by which individual
1 Seeking “mutual beneﬁt” does not imply that the agents are not individually rational—i.e., seeking to
maximize their own individual payoffs by participating in coalitions. This will become more evident shortly.
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agents form such coalitions, generally to solve a problem by coordinating their efforts. The
coalition formation problem can be seen as being composed of the following activities [48]:
(a) the search for an optimal coalition structure; (b) the solution of a joint problem facing
members of each coalition; and (c) division of the value of the generated solution among the
coalition members.
Whileseeminglycomplex,coalitionformationcanbeabstractedintoafairlysimplemodel
undertheassumptionoftransferableutility,whichassumestheexistenceofa(divisible)com-
modity (such as “money”) that players can freely transfer among themselves. Thus, it is easy
to describe the possible allocations of utility among the members of each coalition, as it is
sufﬁcient to specify a single number denoting its worth (i.e., the total payoff available for
division among its members).
Thisistheroleofthecharacteristicfunctionofacoalitionalgamewithtransferableutility
(TU-game):Acharacteristicfunction  : 2N   deﬁnesthevalue (C)ofeachcoalitionC
[60].Intuitively, (C)representsthemaximalpayoffthemembersofC canjointlyreceiveby
cooperatingeffectively.Anallocationisavectorofpayoffs(or“demands”)d = (d1,...,dn)
assigningsomepayofftoeachi   N.Anallocationisfeasiblewithrespecttocoalitionstruc-
ture CS if
 
i C di    (C) for each C   CS, and is efﬁcient if this holds with equality. The
reservation value rvi of an agent i is the amount it can attain by acting alone (in a singleton
coalition): rvi =  ({i}).
Oneimportantconceptregardingcharacteristicfunctionsistheconceptofsuperadditivity.
A characteristic function is called superadditive if any pair (C,T) of disjoint coalitions C
and T is better off by merging into one coalition:  (C   T)    (C) +  (T). Since super-
additivity is unrealistic in many real-world applications, we do not assume it in our work.
Whentransferableutilityisnotassumed,welieintherealmofnon-transferableutility(NTU)
games [38]. We do not deal with NTU games in this work.
When rational agents seek to maximize their individual payoffs, thestability of the under-
lying coalition structure becomes critical. Intuitively, a coalition structure is stable if the
outcomes attained by the coalitions and agreed-upon payoffs are such that both individual
and group rationality are satisﬁed. Research in coalition formation has developed several
notions of stability, among the strongest being the core [28, 31, 35, 48, 24].
Deﬁnition 1 The core of a characteristic function game is the set of coalition structures and
payoff conﬁguration pairs:
 
 CS,d |  C   N,
 
i C
di    (C) and
 
i N
di =
 
C CS
 (C)
 
A core allocation  CS,d  is both feasible and efﬁcient, and no subgroup of players can
guarantee all of its members a higher payoff. As such, no coalition would ever “block” the
proposal for a core allocation. Unfortunately, in many cases the core is empty, as there exist
games for which it is impossible to divide utility to ensure the coalition structure is stable
(i.e., there might always be alternative coalitions that could gain value if they were given the
opportunity to negotiate). Moreover, computing the core or even deciding its non-emptiness
is, in general, intractable [17, 23, 44, 47].
Other cooperative solution concepts include the kernel [18], a stability concept that com-
binesindividualrationalitywithgrouprationalitybyofferingstabilitywithinagivencoalition
structure (and under a given payoff allocation). The kernel is a payoff conﬁguration space
in which each payoff conﬁguration  CS,d  is stable in the sense that any pair of agents i, j
belonging to the same coalition C   CS are in equilibrium with one another, given payoff
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vector d. Agents i and j are said to be in equilibrium if they cannot outweigh one another
within their common coalition—in other words, neither of them can successfully claim a
part of the other’s payoff under conﬁguration  CS,d . The kernel is always non-empty. In
particular, for every CS for which there exists at least one allocation y such that all agents
receive at least their reservation value in y, there also exists an allocation d such that the
resulting conﬁguration is in the kernel (we say that it is kernel-stable). Blankenburg et al.
[9] have recently introduced the fuzzy kernel stability concept for use in fuzzy cooperative
games under coalitional value uncertainty.
In recent years, extensive research has covered many aspects of the coalition formation
problem. Dynamic coalition formation research in particular is interested in the question of
establishing endogenous processes by which agents form coalitions that reach stable struc-
tures, such as the core. Dieckmann and Schwalbe [24] recognize the need to deal with
dynamic coalition formation processes, combining questions of stability with the explicit
monitoring of the process by which coalitions form. They describe a dynamic process of
coalition formation, in which agents are given, at random, the opportunity to abandon or join
existing coalitions and demand a certain payoff. At each stage of the process, a given coali-
tion conﬁguration  CS,d  prevails. With some speciﬁed small probability  , any player may
independentlydecidewhichofthe existingcoalitions to join,andstates a(possiblydifferent)
payoff demand for himself. A player will join a coalition iff it is in her best interest to do
so. These decisions are determined by a non-cooperative best-reply rule, given the coalition
structureandallocationprevailingatthebeginningoftheperiod:aplayerswitchescoalitions
if her expected payoff in the new coalition exceeds her current payoff; and she demands the
most she can get subject to feasibility. The players observe the coalitional structure and the
demands of the other agents in the beginning of the period, and expect the current coalition
structure and demand to prevail in the next period—which is not unrealistic if  is small. It is
assumed that coalitions so formed persist (i.e., continue to participate in the process until the
end of all bargaining rounds). The process allows for experimentation: agents can explore
suboptimal coalition formation actions as well.
The process in which all players adopt the best-reply rule induces a ﬁnite Markov chain
with at least one absorbing state. If the players explore with myopically suboptimal actions,
Dieckmann and Schwalbe prove that if the core is non-empty, each core allocation corre-
sponds to an absorbing state of the resulting best reply with experimentation (BRE) process,
and each absorbing state of this process can be associated with a core allocation. Moreover,
the process converges to a core allocation with probability 1 (if the core is non-empty). How-
ever, Dieckmann and Schwalbe’s model does not explicitly allow for the agents to suggest
and agree on coalitional actions to perform. Moreover, it adopts the usual assumption of full
information regarding coalitional values. Their work is inﬂuenced by the work of Agastya
[2], which is, unlike [24], conﬁned to superadditive environments.
Suijs et al. [56, 57] introduce stochastic cooperative games (SCGs), comprising a set of
agents, a set of coalitional actions, and a function assigning to each action a random variable
with ﬁnite expectation, representing the payoff to the coalition when this action is taken.
Thus uncertainty in coalitional value is present. To accommodate stochastic payoffs, they
use relative shares for the allocation of the residual of the stochastic coalitional values, and
make the—in some cases unrealistic—assumption that agents have common expectations
regarding expected coalitional values; thus, the degree of partial information permitted in
this model is quite limited. This work provides strong theoretical foundations for games with
this restricted form of uncertainty, and describes classes of games for which the core of an
SCG is non-empty. No explicit coalition formation process is assumed. Also, no assump-
tion of incomplete information about partners’s types is made, and thus there is no direct
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translation of type uncertainty into coalition value uncertainty. However, [57] discusses the
effect that different risk behaviour on the part of agents might have on the existence of a core
allocation within a speciﬁc class of SCG games.
Chalkiadakis et al. [10, 12, 15] deﬁne the concept of the Bayesian core (BC) to describe
stabilityundertypeuncertaintyincooperativegameswithstochasticcoalitionalactions.Spe-
cifically, they examine properties of three variants of the Bayesian core concept: the strong,
theweakandthestrictBC.Intuitively,theBCisthesetofcoalition-structure,demand-vector,
agent-belieftriplesthatarestableundertheagents’sprivateprobabilisticbeliefsregardingthe
types (capabilities) of their potential partners. They also extend Dieckmann and Schwalbe’s
BRE process to uncertain environments, guaranteeing convergence to the (strong) BC if it
is non-empty. Unlike [24], this process allows the agents to explicitly propose and agree to
actions to be performed by the coalitions that are formed. We refer to [10, 12, 15] for further
details regarding the BRE process and the Bayesian core. Since the underlying Bayesian
coalitionformationproblemintroducedthereistheoneweadopt,webrieﬂydeﬁnetheBCin
thenextsectionwhenwepresentourrepeatedcoalitionformationmodel.Ouralgorithmsare,
however, orthogonal to the speciﬁc means by which coalitions are formed and the stability
concept used (if indeed, one is required at all). Nevertheless, in some of the experiments in
this paper, we use this BRE process as the negotiation process to illustrate the performance
of our Bayesian RL framework for repeated coalition formation.
2.2 Bayesian reinforcement learning
Consider an agent learning to control a stochastic environment modeled as a Markov deci-
sion process (MDP)  S,A, R, D , with ﬁnite state and action sets S,A, reward function R,
and transition dynamics D. D refers to a family of transition distributions Pr(s,a,·), and
Pr(s,a,s ) is the probability of reaching state s  after taking action a at s. The probabil-
ity with which reward r is obtained when state s is reached after executing a, is denoted
R(s,a,r). The agent has to construct an optimal Markovian policy   : S    A maximizing
the expected sum of future discounted rewards over an inﬁnite horizon. This policy, and its
value, V  (s) at each s   S, can be computed using standard algorithms, such as value or and
policy iteration [43, 58].
In the reinforcement learning setting, an agent does not have direct access to D and/or R,
so it must learn a policy based on its interactions with the environment. While striving to do
so,ithastofacethewell-knownexploration–exploitationtradeoff:shouldoneexploitwhatis
already known by following a policy that currently appears best, or should one explore, that
is,trydifferentactionsinordertogainfurtherinformationaboutrewards R anddynamics D,
and thus potentially revise its view of the optimality of available actions? If the underlying
uncertainty is not properly accounted for, agents risk exploring very unrewarding regions of
policy space.
Whenmodel-basedRLisused,theagentmaintainsanestimatedMDP S,A,   R,   D ,based
on the set of experiences  s,a,r,t  obtained so far; an experience tuple  s,a,r,t  describes
the reward r and transition to state t experienced by the agent when taking an action a while
at state s. At each stage (or at suitable intervals) this MDP can be solved (or approximated).
Single-agent Bayesian methods [20, 21, 25, 42, 49] assume some prior density P over all
possible dynamics models D and reward functions R, which is updated with past experi-
ences. By acting optimally (in a sequential sense), Bayesian RL methods allow agents to
maketheexploration–exploitationtradeoffappropriately,providingaframeworkforoptimal
learning—acting so as to maximize performance while learning.
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More specifically, assume a prior density P over D, R reﬂecting an agent’s belief state
regarding the underlying model. Letting H denote the (current) state-action history of the
observer, we can use the posterior P(D, R|H) to determine an appropriate action choice at
each stage. The formulation of [20] renders this update by Bayes rule tractable by assum-
ing a convenient prior. Specifically, the following assumptions are made: (a) the density P
is factored over R and D, with P(D, R) being the product of independent local densities
P(Ds,a) and P(Rs,a) for each transition and each reward distribution; and (b) each density
P(Ds,a) and P(Rs,a) is Dirichlet [22]. The choice of Dirichlet is appropriate assuming dis-
crete multinomial transition and rewards models, for which Dirichlet priors are conjugate.
As a consequence, the posterior can be represented compactly: after each observed experi-
ence tuple, the posterior is also a Dirichlet. In this way, the posterior P(D|H) over transition
modelsrequiredbytheBayesianapproachcanbefactoredintoposteriorsoverlocalfamilies,
each of the form:
P(Ds,a|Hs,a) = z Pr(Hs,a|Ds,a)P(Ds,a)
where Hs,a is the history of s,a-transitions—captured by updates of the Dirichlet
parameters—and z is a normalizing constant. Similarly,
P(Rs,a|Hs,a) = z Pr(Hs,a|Rs,a)P(Rs,a).
To model P(Ds,a), a Dirichlet parameter vector ns,a is used, with entries ns,a,s 
for each
possible successor state s ; similarly, to model P(Rs,a) a parameter vector ks,a is used, with
entries ks,a,r for each possible reward r. The expectation of Pr(s,a,s ) with respect to P is
givenbyns,a,s 
/
 
i ns,a,si.UpdatingaDirichletisstraightforward:givenprior P(Ds,a;ns,a)
and data vector cs,a (where cs,a,si is the number of observed transitions from s to si under a),
the posterior is given by parameter vector ns,a + cs,a. Thus, the Bayesian approach allows
forthenaturalincorporationofpriorknowledgeintheformofapriorprobabilitydistribution
over all possible MDPs, and admits easy update. In a similar fashion, multi-agent Bayesian
RL agents [11] update prior distributions over the space of possible strategies of others in
addition to the space of possible MDP models.
In a fully observable MDP, the value of an action is a function of both the immediate
reward it provides and the expected state transition, which dictates the opportunity to accrue
future value. In a belief state MDP, the “state transition” includes both a transition in the
underlying state space as well as an update to the belief state. Thus the value of performing
an action at a belief state can implicitly be divided into two components: the expected value
given the current belief state and the value of the action’s impact on the current belief state.
The second component captures the expected value of information (EVOI) of an action.
Each action gives rise to some immediate response by the environment changing the agent’s
beliefs,andsubsequentactionchoiceandexpectedrewardisinﬂuencedbythischange.EVOI
need not be computed directly, but can be combined with “object-level” expected value via
Bellman equations. This can be viewed as the solution of a partially observable MDP (POM-
DP) or equivalently, the belief state MDP. A number of prior studies [11, 20, 21, 41] have
demonstrated the practical value of the Bayesian approach, and the effectiveness of related
approximationalgorithms,inallowingexplorationcoststobeweighedagainsttheirexpected
beneﬁts. This leads to informed, intelligent exploration, and better online performance while
learning than offered by other RL exploration models.
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3 A Bayesian RL framework for repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
Our goal is to develop a framework for modeling situations in which sets of agents come
together repeatedly to form coalitions. Agents participating in coalition formation activities
will generally face two forms of uncertainty: (a) type uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty regarding
the types (or capabilities) of potential partners; and (b) uncertainty regarding the results of
coalitional actions. Unlike the case in one-shot coalitional settings, the potential for repeated
interaction provides agents with an opportunity to learn about both the abilities of their
partners and the nature of coalitional actions over time. This opens up the possibility that
rational agents might explicitly take actions that reduce speciﬁc type or action uncertainty
rather than try to optimize the myopic value of the “next” coalition they join. This is, of
course, nothing more than the exploration–exploitation tradeoff faced by any reinforcement
learning agent.
To this end, our model for optimal repeated coalition formation brings together coali-
tion formation under uncertainty (specifically the Bayesian coalitional model proposed in
[12, 15]) with Bayesian reinforcement learning to properly capture the both aspects of this
learning process and the interactions that arise between them.
To capture the “stage games” within which agents form coalitions at each stage of the
RL process, in Sect. 3.1 we review the model of Bayesian coalition formation introduced
in [12, 15]. We then describe the full reinforcement learning model in Sect. 3.2. While we
brieﬂy discuss certain stability concepts for Bayesian coalition formation, we note that our
Bayesian RL framework is largely independentof the means by which coalitions are formed,
relying only on the Bayesian formulation of the coalition problem and certain assumptions
about the form of coalitional agreements.
3.1 A Bayesian model for cooperative games under uncertainty
Theneedtoaddresstypeuncertainty,oneagent’suncertaintyabouttheabilitiesofitspotential
partners, is critical to the modeling of realistic coalition formation problems. For instance, if
a carpenter wants to ﬁnd a plumber and electrician with whom to build a house, her decision
to propose (or join) such a partnership, to engage in a speciﬁc type of project, and to accept
a speciﬁc share of the surplus generated should all depend on her (probabilistic) assessment
of their abilities. To capture this, we start by introducing the problem of Bayesian coalition
formation under type uncertainty. We then show how this type uncertainty can be translated
into coalitional value uncertainty.
We adopt the model proposed in [12, 15]. A Bayesian coalition formation problem under
type uncertainty is a cooperative game deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 (Bayesian coalition formation problem [12, 15]) A Bayesian coalition forma-
tionproblem(BCFP)isacoalitionformationproblemthatischaracterizedbyasetofagents,
N; a set of types Ti for each agent i   N; a set AC of coalitional actions for each coalition
C   N; a set O of stochastic outcomes (or states); with transition dynamics Pr(s| C,tC)
denoting the probability of an outcome s   O given that coalition C whose members have
type vector tC takes coalitional action  C; a reward function R : O     ; and agent
beliefs Bi for each agent i   N comprising a joint distribution over types T i of potential
partners.
We now describe each of the BCFP components in turn: we assume a set of agents
N ={ 1,...,n},andforeachagenti aﬁnitesetofpossibletypesTi.Eachagenti hasaspeciﬁc
type t   Ti, which intuitively captures i’s “abilities”. An agent’s type is private information.
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We let T = i NTi denote the set of type proﬁles. For any coalition C   N,TC = i CTi,
andforanyi   N,T i = j =iTj.Eachi knowsitsowntypeti,butnotthoseofotheragents.
Agent i’s beliefs Bi comprise a joint distribution over T i, where Bi(t i) is the probability
i assigns to other agents having type proﬁle t i. We use Bi(tC) to denote the marginal of Bi
over any subset C of agents, and for ease of notation, we let Bi(ti) refer to i “beliefs” about
its own type (assigning probability 1 to its actual type and 0 to all others). We may assume
that the prior Bi is derived from a common knowledge B over T conditioned agent i’s true
type, but this is not critical in this paper (but see [15]).
A coalition C has available to it a ﬁnite set of coalitional actions AC. We can think of AC
as the set of decisions available to C on how to deal with the underlying task at hand—or
evenadecisiononwhattasktodealwith.Whenanactionistaken,itresultsinsomeoutcome
or state s   O. The odds with which an outcome is realized depends on the types of the
coalition members (e.g., the outcome of building a house will depend on the capabilities of
the team members). We let Pr(s| ,tC) denote the probability of outcome s given that coa-
lition C takes action     AC and member types are given by tC   TC.2 This probability is
assumed to be known by all agents. Our model can be generalized to allow uncertainty over
the action dynamics: for example, agents may have Dirichlet priors over the probabilities
of each outcome, which could be updated in the standard Bayesian fashion given observed
outcomes (and inﬂuenced by estimated types of its partners). This would make our model
more like standard single-agent RL models. However, we ignore such action uncertainty
in order to simplify the presentation and focus purely on the impact of type learning on
coalition formation. Finally, we assume that each state s results in some reward R(s). If s
results from a coalitional action, the members are assigned R(s), which is assumed to be
divisible/transferable among them.
We illustrate the basic formulation with a simple, partial example. Consider a three-agent
scenario with one carpenter (agent 1) and two electricians (agents 2 and 3). The electricians
and carpenters have three types—good (g), medium (m) and bad (b)— and each agent has
beliefs about the others. For simplicity, we focus on the beliefs B1 of the carpenter, who
believes agent 3 is somewhat more competent than agent 2:
Agent 2 Agent 3
Type g m b g m b
B1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2
The true types of each agent will be private information. Let’s assume the true type of the
carpenter is t1 = g, and suppose that a coalition consisting of a carpenter and an electrician
can undertake an ambitious or a moderate housing project. The probabilities of success or
failure are dictated by the type-vector of the pair, for example (listing only the outcome
probabilities for carpenter type tc = g for brevity):
2 The model can be extended to allow action effects to depend on not just the types of the coalition members,
but on other factors as well. Dependence on the actions taken by other coalitions, for example, would induce a
stage game of incomplete information between coalitions. Dependence on the state of the environment (e.g.,
as dictated by the outcomes of prior actions) would require modeling the environment as a Markov decision
process. We do not consider such extensions here in order to isolate the problem of learning in repeated
coalition formation.
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Type vector (tc,te)( g,g)( g,m)( g,b)
P(succ) P(fail) P(succ) P(fail) P(succ) P(fail)
Ambitious 0.8 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.9
Moderate 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.3
Finally assume a successful ambitious project has coalitional reward 1000, a successful
moderate project has reward 500, and any failed project has reward 0.
Now we turn to the problem of showing how type (and action) uncertainty in a BCFP can
be translated into coalitional value uncertainty. In a BCFP, the (immediate)value of coalition
C with members of type tC is:
V(C|tC) = max
  AC
 
s
Pr(s| ,tC)R(s) = max
  AC
Q(C, |tC) (1)
where, intuitively, Q(C, |tC) represents the value (or quality) of coalitional action   to
coalition C that is made up of members with types tC. V(C|tC) therefore represents the
(maximal) payoff that coalition C can obtain by choosing the best coalitional action. Unfor-
tunately, this coalition value cannot be used in the coalition formation process if the agents
are uncertain about the types of their potential partners (since any potential partners may
have one of several types, any agent in any C would be uncertain about the type proﬁle tC
of its members, and thus about the value V(C)). However, each agent i has beliefs about
the (immediate, or myopic) value of any coalition based on its expectation of this value with
respect to other agents’s types:
Vi(C) = max
  AC
 
tC TC
Bi(tC)Q(C, |tC) = max
  AC
Qi(C, ) (2)
where, intuitively, Qi(C, ) represents the expected value (or, expected quality) of   to coa-
lition C, according to i’s beliefs. Note that Vi(C) is not simply the expectation of V(C) with
respect to i’s belief about types. The expectation Qi of action values (i.e., Q-values) cannot
be moved outside the max operator: a single action must be chosen which is useful given i’s
uncertainty. Of course, i’s estimate of the value of a coalition, or any coalitional action, may
not conform with those of other agents (e.g., i may believe that k is competent, while j may
believe that k is incompetent; thus, i will believe that coalition  i, j,k  has a much higher
value than j does). However, i is certain of its reservation value, the amount it can attain by
acting alone: rvi = Vi({i}) = max  A{i}
 
s Pr(s| ,ti)R(s).
In our example above, agent 1’s beliefs about 3’s type inform her beliefs about the imme-
diate, or one-shot, values of partnering with agent 3. Specifically, the expected values of
ambitious and moderate projects with agent 3 can be computed as follows:
Q1({1,3}, Ambitious) = (0.8 · 0.5 + 0.4 · 0.3 + 0.1 · 0.2)1000 = 540 (3)
Q1({1,3}, Moderate) = (0.9 · 0.5 + 0.8 · 0.3 + 0.7 · 0.2)500 = 415 (4)
Hence, given these quality values, agent 1 would probably want to engage in an ambitious
project with 3 in a one-shot problem. (Notice that these must dominate the expected values
of partnering with 2 given 1’s beliefs.) However, the ﬁnal evaluation of such a partnership
decision would have to take into account the agreed allocation within a coalition, as will now
become apparent.
Because of the stochastic nature of payoffs in BCFPs, we assume that agents join a coali-
tion with certainrelative payoffdemands[56, 57]. Intuitively, sinceaction uncertaintymeans
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agentscannotpredictcoalitionpayoff(and,consequently,thepayoffsharestocoalitionmem-
bers) with certainty, it is natural to place relative demands on the fractional share of the real-
izedpayoff.Thisdirectly accountsforthe allocation ofunexpectedgainsorlosses.Formally,
let d represent the payoff demand vector  d1,...,dn , and dC the subset of these demands
corresponding to agents in coalition C, and assume that these demands are observable by
all agents. For any i   C we deﬁne the relative demand of agent i to be ri = di  
j C dj . If
reward R is received by coalition C as a result of its choice of action, each i receives payoff
ri R. This means that the gains or losses deriving from the fact that the reward function is
stochastic will be allocated to the agents in proportion to their agreed upon demands. As
such, each agent has beliefs about any other agent’s expected payoff given a coalition struc-
ture and demand vector. Specifically, i’s beliefs about the (maximum) expected stochastic
payoff of some agent j   C is denoted ¯ pi
j = rjVi(C). Similarly, if i   C,i believes its own
(maximum) expected payoff to be ¯ pi
i = riVi(C).
If all agents in coalition C had the same beliefs about the expected value of the avail-
able actions AC, then all would agree to execute the action with maximum expected value
(assuming risk neutrality). However, agents enter coalitions with potentially different beliefs
about the types of their partners. Since the expected value of action   predicted by agent
i   C depends critically on i’s beliefs Bi, each agent may have different estimates of the
expected value of any coalitional action.3 Hence, the choice of action must also be part of the
negotiated agreement. Given a coalition structure CS, an action vector is a tuple consisting
of one action     AC for each C   CS. To this end, we deﬁne a coalition agreement vector
to be a triple  CS,d,   where CS is a coalition structure, d is a demand vector, and   is an
action vector, with Ci denoting the C   CS of which i is a member (and let r be the relative
demand vector corresponding to d).
Thestabilityofavectorofcoalitionalagreementscanbedeﬁnedinseveraldifferentways.
While the speciﬁc stability concept used is not critical to the repeated coalition formal model
we develop below, we brieﬂy two forms of the Bayesian core, a stability concept introduced
for BCFPs in [12, 15].
Deﬁnition 3 (weak Bayesian core [15]) Let  CS,d,   be a coalition agreement vector, with
Ci denoting the C   CS of which i is a member.  CS,d,   (or equivalently  CS,r,  ) is
in the weak Bayesian core of a BCFP iff there is no coalition S   N, demand vector dS and
action     AS s.t. ¯ pi
i(S,dS, ) > ¯ pi
i(Ci,dCi, Ci), i   S, where dCi, Ci is the restriction
of d,  to the Ci coalition.
In words, there is no coalition such that all of its members believe that they would be
strictly better off in it (in terms of expected payoffs, given some choice of action) than they
are in CS. The agents’s beliefs, in every C   CS, “coincide” in the weak sense that there is a
payoff allocation dC and some coalitional action  C that is commonly believed to ensure a
better payoff. This doesn’t mean that dC and  C is what each agent believes to be best. But
an agreement on dC and  C is enough to keep any other coalition S from forming. Even if
one agent proposed its formation, others would disagree because they would not expect to
become strictly better off themselves.
A stronger notion can be deﬁned as well:
3 To focus on learning of agent types over time, we assume that the distribution of outcomes given action
  and the reward function are known. In model-based RL these too are uncertain. The definition of a BCFP
is easily generalized to allow for unknown action models, which would add a further source of discrepancy
among the beliefs of agents.
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Deﬁnition 4 (strong Bayesian core [15]) Let  CS,d,   be a coalition agreement vector,
with Ci denoting the C   CS of which i is a member.  CS,d,   (or equivalently  CS,r,  )
is in the strong Bayesian core iff there is no coalition S   N, demand vector dS and action
    AS s.t. for some i   S
¯ pi
i(S,dS, ) > ¯ pi
i(Ci,dCi, Ci)
and
¯ pi
j(S,dS, )  ¯ pi
j(Cj,dCj, Cj)
 j   S, j  = i.
The strong BC is more tightly linked to an agent’s subjective view of the potential accept-
ability of their proposals and is thus more “endogenous” in nature.
3.2 Optimal repeated coalition formation under uncertainty
We now turn our attention to the problem of acting and learning in repeated coalition forma-
tion settings.
3.2.1 A model for repeated coalition formation
The learning process proceeds in stages. Intuitively, at each stage agents come together with
only partial knowledge of the types of their counterparts. They engage in some coalition
formation process (e.g., negotiation or bargaining), forming various teams, each governed
by a coalition agreement (i.e., agreement on the action to be taken by the team as well as
the relative payoff share for each team member). Once the coalitions have completed their
actions and observed the outcomes, each agent gains some information about the members
of its team. Specifically, the action outcome provides (noisy) evidence about the coalition
type vector to each member of that coalition. Agent’s update their beliefs, and then enter the
next stage of coalition formations.
More formally, the process can be described as follows: we assume an inﬁnite horizon
model in which a set of agents N faces a Bayesian coalition formation problem at each stage
0   t <  . The BCFP at each stage is identical except that, at stage t, each agent i may
enter the coalition formation process with updated beliefs Bt
i that reﬂect its past interactions
with previous partners.4 Each agent i enters the coalition formation process with beliefs Bt
i
about the types of all agents (including the certain knowledge of its own type). Coalitions
are formed, resulting in a coalition agreement vector  CSt,dt, t , with coalition structure
CSt, demand vector dt (and induced relative demand vector rt), and action vector  t. Let
Ci denote the C   CSt of which i is a member. Each C   CSt takes its agreed upon action
 t
C and observes the stochastic outcome s that is realized. The reward R(s) is obtained, with
each i in C obtaining its relative shareri R(s) (whereri = di/
 
j C dj). Such outcomes are
“local,” that is, depending only upon the action  C taken by C and the type vector tC, with
Pr(s| ,tC) dictating outcome dynamics. We assume limited observability: agent i observes
only the outcome the action of its own coalition Ci, not those of other coalitions.
Once coalitional agreements are reached, actions are executed, and outcomes observed at
stage t, the process moves to stage t + 1 and repeats. We assume a discount factor   (with
4 We discuss below—and experiment with—settings where the action and reward model vary from stage to
stage; but we always assume that the collection of agents, the set of possible types Ti, and the private type of
each agent is ﬁxed across all stages.
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0    < 1), and model assume agents wish to maximize the expected discounted sum of
future rewards. Specifically, let Rt
i be a random variable denoting agent i’s realized reward
share at stage t of the process (i.e., in the outcome of coalitional agreements and actions at
stage t). Then i’s goal is to maximize
   
t=0
  t Rt
i.
3.2.2 A POMDP formulation
To model the behaviour of agents in the repeated coalition formation, the most appropriate
formal model would be that of a Bayesian extensive form game. However, we make certain
simplifying assumptions, and instead model this as a partially observable Markov decision
process. We contrast the POMDP with a full game-theoretic treatment after describing the
POMDP formulation.
Our primary goal is to capture how the repeated coalitional setting should inﬂuence how
agents should approach their coalitional negotiations at each stage game. Each member of
coalition C can thus update its beliefs about the types of the members of its coalitions:
Bt+1
i (tC) = z Pr(s| ,tC)Bt
i(tC) (5)
where z is a normalizing constant. When time is clear from context, we denote this updated
belief state B
s, 
i .
We make one key simplifying assumption, namely, that agent’s beliefs are not updated
during the coalition formation process itself. In general, any negotiation process that is used
todeterminecoalitionsandcoalitionalagreementscanrevealconsiderableinformationabout
one’s partners. For example, strategic models of coalition formation as Bayesian extensive
form games have been developed for standard coalition formation problems [16, 39] and for
BCFPs [15], during which agents update their beliefs during a negotiation process. If this
process is well-deﬁned, an intermediate stage of belief update can be factored into our model
(and updates based on observing action outcomes would be made against this intermediate
model). However, our aim is to abstract away from the specifics of the coalition formation
process adopted.
We illustrate the computation of updated beliefs in our earlier example. Suppose agents 1
and 3 partnered and attempted an ambitious project which failed. Agent 1 would update its
beliefs about 3’s type by conditioning its prior on the observed failure, obtaining posterior
beliefs B 
1:
Agent 2 Agent 3
Type g m b g m b
B 
1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.22 0.39 0.39
The failure of the ambitious project strongly suggests that 3’s type is not g. Note that
its beliefs about agent 2 are unchanged since we assume 1 can make no observation of the
actions or outcomes of coalitions other than its own.
Given the sequential nature of the process, the decisions made by agents regarding which
speciﬁc coalitions to join—and which coalitional agreements to adopt—should be informed
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not only by the immediate expected value of those coalitions; such decisions should also be
inﬂuenced by the impact they may have on future decisions. For example, one agent i may
be so uncertain about the type of a potential partner j that the risk of joining a coalition
with j has lower expected immediate value than a joining a “safer” team about which it has
more certain beliefs. However, should i join with j and discover that, in fact, j’s capabili-
ties complement its own, this knowledge would prove very valuable, allowing i to partner
with j over a long period of time (multiple stages) to reap the dividends of this information.
A coalition formation process that does not account for the value of information would never
allow i to partner with j, hence never discover this hidden value.
To account for just such considerations, we approach optimal repeated coalition forma-
tion using a sequential model that allow for just such exploration–exploitation tradeoffs to
be made explicitly. By using Bayesian exploration, agents optimize long-term sequential
value, balancing exploration with exploitation to optimize expected accumulated reward
given their current beliefs. We cast the problem as a partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP), or equivalently, a belief-state MDP. We assume an inﬁnite horizon prob-
lem, with discount factor   (with 0    < 1), and model agents who wish to maximize the
expected discounted sum of future rewards. It is reasonably straightforward to formulate the
optimality equations for this POMDP; however, certain subtleties will arise because of an
agent’s lack of knowledge of other agent beliefs.
Let agent i have beliefs Bi about the types of other agents. Let Qi(C, ,dC, Bi) denote
the long-term value i places on being a member of coalition C with agreed-upon action  
and stated agent demands dC = di;i   C  (denoting the agents’s requested payoffs from
theformation process),realizingthatafterthis actionistakenthecoalition formation process
will repeat. This is accounted for using Bellman equations [6] as follows:
Qi(C, ,dC, Bi) =
 
s
Pr(s|C, , Bi)[ri R(s) +  Vi(B
s, 
i )]
=
 
tC
Bi(tC)
 
s
Pr(s| ,tC)[ri R(s) +  Vi(B
s, 
i )] (6)
Vi(Bi) =
 
C|i C,dC
Pr(C, ,dC|Bi)Qi(C, ,dC, Bi) (7)
(Recall that ri is i’s relative demand of the payoff received by Ci, hence ri R(s) describes
i’s reward.) Vi(Bi) reﬂects the value of belief state Bi to i, deriving from the fact that given
beliefs Bi, agent i may ﬁnd itself participating in any of a number of possible coalitional
agreements, each of which has some Q-value (we elaborate below).
Of note is the fact that agent i considers the (expected, discounted) value of being in its
updated belief state B
s, 
i —obtained after joining coalition Ci, demanding di, and executing
coalitionalaction Ci—whencomputingthevalueofanycoalitionalagreement.Specifically,
theQ-valueandvaluefunctionsforthebeliefstateMDP,describedbyEqs.6and7,explicitly
incorporate both immediate and future coalitional value in a way that embraces the expected
value of information: coalitional decisions at future stages may exploit information gleaned
from the current interaction.
Unlike typical Bellman equations, the value function Vi cannot be deﬁned by maximiz-
ing Q-values. This is because the choice that dictates reward, namely, the coalition that is
formed, is not in complete control of agent i. Instead, i must predict, based on it beliefs, the
probability Pr(C, ,dC|Bi) with which a speciﬁc coalition C (to which it belongs) and a
corresponding action-demands pair   C,dC  will arise as a result of negotiation. However,
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with this in hand, the value equations provide the means to determine the long-term value of
any coalitional agreement.
3.2.3 A Bayesian extensive form game model
A fully general formulation of the repeated coalition setting would require a Bayesian exten-
sive form game (BEFG) in which the bargaining or negotiation actions at each BCFP stage
game are explicitly modeled. Once coalitional actions are determined at stage t, there are no
furtheractionchoicesatthatstaget,sincetheagreementsthemselvesdetermineactionstaken
bytheagents;buttheinformationrevealedaboutone’spartnersbytheexecutionofcoalitional
actionswouldcauseadditionalbeliefupdateinthegameprocess.Suchamodelwouldrequire
explicit representation of the beliefs of all agents at each stage of the negotiation process and
afterexecutionofcoalitionalactions.Theappropriatesolutionconceptwouldthenbeaperfect
Bayesianequilibrium(PBE):agentspossessasystemofbeliefs(beliefsaboutopponenttypes
at each decision point), and adopt behavioural strategies (mappings from beliefs to actions at
each decision point); and these beliefs and strategies must be in equilibrium in the sense that
each agent’s strategy must be optimal (at all subgames) given its beliefs and the strategies of
its opponents, and the beliefs must be determined by Bayesian update w.r.t. the behavioural
strategies.
There are two key reasons we do not adopt such a model. First, our model is intended to
work with different forms of coalitional negotiation. The formulation of the BEFG requires
a commitment to a speciﬁc negotiation protocol, whereas our model assumes only that some
coalition formation process is adopted and that the probability of speciﬁc coalitional agree-
ments can be estimated. While a BEFG formulation that abstracts away the details of the
negotiation processes during the BCFP stage games would be desirable, this is not feasible
since the only strategic behaviour available to the agents is embedded within the stage games
themselves. Outside of the stage games in which coalitional negotiation takes place, agents
have no decisions to make: they simply implement their agreed upon coalitional actions and
observe the results. One might consider adopting an empirical games approach [61], using
detailed simulation to obtain a high-level description or characterization of the underlying
negotiation process and use these results to inform PBE computation. However such an
approach is beyond the scope of this work.
The second reason is the analytic and computational intractability of BEFGs. Analyzing
equilibria of BEFGs is notoriously difﬁcult, especially given the complexity of the repeated
coalition formation problems we propose. Even studying the BEFG formulation of the stage
games themselves (see [15] for such an analysis) often requires simplifying assumptions.
The computation of such equilibrium is also unlikely to prove practical for anything but the
simplest settings.
Our POMDP model can thus be viewed as a heuristic approximation to the modeling of
the behaviour of strategically-aware agents. The model abstracts much of the detail about
strategic interactions into beliefs about agent types, and makes the simplifying assumption
that updates of these beliefs is based only on the “objective” evidence supplied by action
outcomes(i.e.,evidencethatisnotmanipulablebythestrategicchoicesofotheragents).This
does prevent us from capturing sophisticated strategies that explicitly link behaviour across
stages (e.g., in which the outcomes of future negotiations can be inﬂuenced by past strategic
behaviour, for example, via “threats”). However, while this an important avenue for future
research, we believe that, by taking such an approach, practical analytic and computational
results would be possible only for the simplest of settings.
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3.3 Estimating agreement probabilities
One aspect of the POMDP model that is not directly part of the input are the “agreement”
probabilities Pr(C, ,dC|Bi) that an agent i needs to predict the coalitional agreements
that might arise. These probabilities obviously depend on the precise coalition formation
mechanism adopted, and can be estimated or approximated in a variety of ways.
If a discounted coalitional bargaining model is assumed [15, 16, 39], an agent i can com-
pute these probabilities by simulating the process of solving the game tree (possibly using a
heuristicalgorithm).Iftheequilibriumsolutionisuniquethentheresultingagreementvector
 CS,d,  willoccurwithcertainty.Ifmultiplesolutionsarise,eachcanbeassigneduniform
probability of occurrence, or some other biases could be incorporated.
Incontrast,asimplerformofnegotiationcouldbeassumed,suchasthebestresponsewith
experimentation (BRE) process [12, 15, 24] discussed in Sect. 2, a simple dynamic negotia-
tion process in which agents make proposals (in some predetermined or random order) and
groups of agents accept or reject them using myopic best responses w.r.t. the existing set of
coalitional agreements. The process can be modeled as Markov chain [24] whose state at
time t is simply the prevailing agreement vector  CSt,dt, t . The steady-state distribution
P  of this chain then dictates the probability of ending up with any speciﬁc set of coalitional
agreements.
However, such an approach is inherently problematic in our setting. The transition matrix
oftheMarkovchain,hencethesteady-statedistribution,requiresknowledgeofallparameters
affecting the state transitions of the BRE process (or any other heuristic negotiation process).
Unfortunately, a speciﬁc agent i does not have complete knowledge of these parameters,
since it has only probabilistic information of the types of other agents, and is unaware of
their beliefs. Expectations w.r.t. agent types can be used of course. The use of common prior
can help approximate the beliefs of other agents as well, though this can be somewhat prob-
lematic. Suppose for example, that at each RL stage, there is a common prior, shared by
all agents, specifying the probability with which the agent type proﬁles are drawn; and that
agents use this common prior to estimate the probabilities (beliefs) that other agents of a
speciﬁc type assign to type proﬁles (i.e., each agent uses the common prior to represent the
beliefs of their opponents). Using the prior in this static fashion to account for the beliefs of
othersisunrealistic,sinceagentsupdatetheirbeliefsattheconclusionofeachstageoftheRL
process. Furthermore, even with a common prior, it is not possible for agents to accurately
monitor the belief dynamics of other agents, since they are unable to observe the outcomes
of the actions of coalitions other than their own.
For these reasons (and others discussed in the next section), we do not try to compute
the Markov chain or its steady-state distribution. Rather, we approximate the quantities
Pr(C, ,dC|Bi) determined by BRE (or other dynamic) processes, in other ways (which
we elaborate in the next section). In addition, should it be necessary for an agent to estimate
the beliefs of others, we avoid the simple static common prior assumption, and instead use a
heuristic approach.
4 Computational approximations
Computing the exact solution Bayesian optimal solution to the reinforcement learning
problem for repeated coalition formation, as speciﬁed by Eqs. 6 and 7, is generally infeasi-
ble for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the difﬁculty of estimating relevant quantities,
agreementprobabilitiesinparticular,willoftenrequiresomeapproximation.Second,because
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Table1 Approximatingtheoptimalsolutiontotheproblemofrepeatedcoalitionformationunderuncertainty
1. Each agent i with belief state Bi computes the Q-value of potential agreements  C, ,dC  in which it
participates by approximating the solution to Eqs. 6 and 7, using one of the following algorithms
(described below): OSLA, VPI, VPI-over-OSLA, Myopic, MAP
2. The agents engage in some coalition formation process, with each agent using the Q-values computed
above in order to represent the long term value of coalitional agreements. The process results in a
coalition structure CS, a payoff allocation vector d, and a vector of coalitional actions  , one for
each coalition C   CS
3. After observing the result of the coalitional action  Ci of the coalition Ci to which it belongs, each
agent i updates it beliefs about its partners j   Ci, j  = i using Eq. 5
4. The RL process repeats
solving POMDPs is generally intractable, especially given the size of the state space (the
cross-product of agent types), action space (the set of coalitional agreements), solving the
induced POMDP will also require some form of approximation to be practical.
In this section, we describe several algorithms that approximate the POMDP solution.
Each of the Bayesian RL algorithms below can be combined with any underlying negoti-
ation process: we require only that the process result in coalitional agreements of the type
 C, ,dC assumedabove,andthatagentscanestimatetheprobabilityofspeciﬁcagreements
given beliefs about agent types. A skeletal algorithm is shown in Table 1. We now describe
four instantiations of this framework, of varying levels of sophistication.
4.1 The one-step lookahead algorithm
The ﬁrst approximate RL algorithm is the one-step lookahead algorithm (OSLA). While
dynamic programming techniques are often used for solving POMDPs [30, 55], (tree) search
techniques are often more effective for MDPs (and POMDPs) [5, 19] over when the initial
state(orbeliefstate)isknown.InOSLA,weuseaveryrestrictedformoftreesearch,looking
ahead only a single step at the value of coalitional agreements at the current state Bt
i at time
t and possible states at the next stage Bt+1
i given possible outcomes of coalitional actions.
This maintains tractability, exploiting the fact that only a (relatively) small number of belief
states can be reached after the execution of a single coalitional action.
Moreprecisely,wecomputetheQ-valuesofsuccessorstatesinEq.6intheOSLAmethod
myopically. Specifically, we deﬁne the one-step lookahead Q-value of agreement  C, ,dC 
for agent i, under belief state Bi, to be:
Q1
i (C, ,dC, Bi) =
 
s
Pr(s|C, , Bi)[ri R(s) +  V 0
i (B
s, 
i )]
=
 
tC
Bi(tC)
 
s
Pr(s| ,tC)[ri R(s) +  V 0
i (B
s, 
i )] (8)
V0
i (Bi) =
 
C,  A(C),dC|i C
Pr(C, ,dC|Bi)Q0
i (C, ,dC, Bi) (9)
Q0
i (C, ,dC, Bi) = ri
 
tC TC
Bi(tC)
 
s
Pr(s| ,tC)R(s) (10)
In Eq. 8, V 0
i (B
s, 
i ) represents the myopic, or immediate value of the successor belief state
to Bi, which is deﬁned (Eq. 9) to be the expected immediate, rather than long-term, value of
the agreement that will emerge.
123Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst
As discussed above, computing the probability of agreement terms Pr(C, ,dC|Bi) can
be very difﬁcult. As a result, we approximate these probabilities by assuming a speciﬁc
negotiation process, and again adopt a simple one-step look ahead perspective on coalitional
negotiations. Specifically, we assume that agents engage in a the best-response with exper-
imentation (BRE) process for BCFPs discussed above. (We refer to [10, 12] for a detailed
description of the BRE process.) While this process induces a Markov chain over coalition
structuresandagreements,weassumethattheprocesswillterminateafterasinglestepofthis
process. We then estimate the probability of an agreement to be the probability at reaching
that agreement at the ﬁrst stage of the induced Markov chain. We note that agents need only
compute Q-values, both Q1
i (C, ,dC, Bi) and Q0
i (C, ,dC, Bi), for agreements that can
be reached at those stages. Since only a small number of agreements could be reached by a
restricted negotiation process, this further enhances computational tractability.
We chose to use a negotiation tree-depth bound of one when computing agreement prob-
abilities using the BRE process in our experiments, largely for reasons of computational
efﬁciency. However, this lookahead bound could take any value of l   1, depending on the
speciﬁc setting’s requirements. In addition, the continuous nature of agent demands and the
combinatorial number of type vectors can also cause computational difﬁculty in evaluation
the search tree, even to depth one. Nevertheless, the use of sampling and appropriate discret-
ization of demands can alleviate these problems. We discuss this in Sect. 6 when describing
our experiments.
Anotherissuethatweaddressistheevolutionofbeliefs.Astaticcommonpriorisinappro-
priate,sinceeachagentwillupdateitsbeliefsateachstageoftheRLprocess.Butasdiscussed
above, agents have little evidence upon which to update their knowledge of the belief states
of other agents due to the limited observability in our model. We account heuristically for
this within OSLA by having agents initially adopt a static assumption about the beliefs of
all other agents: specifically, an agent i will assume that all agents j  = i maintain their
prior for the ﬁrst k stages of the RL process. After k stages, agents will adopt a convergent
assumption: specifically, agent i will assume that the beliefs of all agents j coincide with
its own.5 This is a very crude heuristic that attempts to account for the dynamic nature of
opponent beliefs, exploiting the fact that the beliefs of all agents (with sufﬁcient exploration
of structures and agreements) will converge toward the true vector, despite the very limited
observability of opponent belief dynamics.
We note that many of these approximations provide only crude estimates of long-term
value. We will see this reﬂected in the performance of OSLA below.
4.2 The VPI exploration method
The value of perfect information (VPI) exploration method is an RL technique that approxi-
matesoptimalBayesianexplorationusingthe(myopic)expectedvalueofperfectinformation
inherent in an agent’s actions. VPI exploration was initially developed in [20, 21] for sin-
gle-agent environments. We extend the VPI formulation to the multiagent, repeated coalition
settingbydeﬁninghowtoestimatetheexpected(myopic)valueofperfectinformationofcoa-
litional agreements given an agent’s current beliefs. The sequential value of any coalitional
action, accounting for its value of information, is then used in the formation process.
Let us consider what can be gained by learning the true value of a coalitional agreement
  = C, ,dC . Suppose   is adopted, its action   executed, and assume that it provides
exact evidence regarding the types of the agents in C. Thus, we assume that the real type
5 Our experiments in Sect. 6 use static beliefs for the ﬁrst 50 RL steps and convergent beliefs after that.
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vector t 
C is revealed following  . If agent types are revealed, then the true value of   is also
revealed: it is simply agent i’s share of expected coalition value given  , which we denote
by q 
  = q 
 C, ,dC  = Qi(C, ,dC|t 
C), where
Qi(C, ,dC|t 
C) = ri
 
s
Pr(s| ,t 
C)R(s). (11)
This is a “myopic” calculation of the speciﬁc (future) coalitional agreement value, assuming
the adoption of   and subsequent revelation of actual agent types.
This new knowledge is of value to agent i only if it leads to a change of its policy. This
can happen in two cases: (a) when the information shows that a coalitional action that was
previously regarded as inferior to the best action is now revealed to be the best choice; or (b)
when the information indicates that the action previously regarded as best is actually worse
than the second best action.
For case (a), suppose that given current belief state Bi the value of i’s current best action
 1 = C1, 1,dC1  is q1 = Qi(C1, 1,dC1|Bi) = EBi[q C1, 1,dC1 ]. Moreover, suppose
that the new knowledge indicates that   is a better action; that is, q 
  > q1. Thus, we expect
i to gain q 
    q1 by virtue of performing   instead of  1.
For case (b), suppose that the value of the second best action  2 = C2, 2,dC2  is
q2 = Qi(C2, 2,dC2|Bi) = EBi[q C2, 2,dC2 ]. If action   coincides with the action consid-
ered best,  1, and the new knowledge indicates that the real value q 
 1 = q 
  is less than the
value of the previously considered second-best action—that is, if q 
 1 < q2—then the agent
should perform  2 instead of  1 and we expect it to gain q2   q 
 1.
Thus, the gain from learning the true value q 
  of the   agreement is:
gain (q 
 |t 
C) =
 
 
 
q2   q 
 , if   =  1 and q 
  < q2
q 
    q1, if    =  1 and q 
  > q1
0, otherwise
(12)
However, agent i does not know what types (and, consequently, which Q-value) will be
revealed for  ; therefore, we need to take into account the expected gain given its prior
beliefs. Hence, we compute the expected value of perfect information of  :
VPI( |Bi) =
 
t
 
C
gain (q 
 |t 
C)Bi(t 
C) (13)
Expected VPI gives an upper bound on the myopic value of information for exploring coali-
tionalaction .Theexpectedcostofthisexplorationisthedifferencebetweenthe(expected)
value of   and the value of the action currently considered best, i.e., q1   EBi[q ], where
EBi[q ]=EBi[q C, ,dC ] is given by EBi[q ]=ri
 
tC TC Bi(tC)
 
s Pr(s| ,tC)R(s).
Consequently, an agent should choose the action that maximizes
VPI( |Bi)   (q1   EBi[q ]). (14)
This strategy is equivalent to choosing the proposal that maximizes:
QVi( |Bi) = EBi[q ]+VPI( |Bi) (15)
Agentsthenusethese QV valuesinsteadofusingtheusualQ-valuesintheirdecisionmaking
for forming coalitions. The computation of expected values and VPI above can be done in a
straightforward manner if the number of possible type conﬁgurations is small. If, however,
this number is large, sampling of type vectors can be employed.
In summary, the VPI algorithm proceeds as follows:
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1. The “true” Q-values of any potential agreement  , with respect to each realization of
the relevant type vector, are myopically calculated via Eq. 11.
2. The gain from reaching agreement   is calculated via Eq. 12.
3. The VPI for   is calculated via Eq. 13.
4. The Q-values QVi for (any)   are calculated through Eq. 15 (and are subsequently used
in the coalition formation process).
VPI exploration is in a sense non-myopic, since it implicitly reasons about the value of
future belief states through its use of value of perfect information is estimating the value
of future coalitional agreements. However, VPI uses myopic calculations when determining
the value of agreements. Even though this is an approximation, it enables the method to
exploit the value of (perfect) information regarding agent types, however myopic the estima-
tion of this value may be, instead of estimating the speciﬁc value of anticipated coalitional
actions (in contrast to lookahead methods). Unlike lookahead methods, VPI does not have
to explicitly incorporate the common prior hypothesis when estimating the Q-values used
during coalition formation, nor doesit needto accountforthe probability ofagreementwhen
transitioningtofuturebeliefstates.TheVPIexplorationmethodisthuslesstightlycoupledto
the details of the underlying coalition formation process. As we demonstrate below, myopic
VPI estimation works very well in a variety of experimental settings.
Nevertheless, we also develop a method which combines VPI with OSLA. VPI-over-
OSLA uses the application of VPI over Q-values estimated using the OSLA method. When
this method is used, the values of currently expected best action, second best action and
exploratory action   are estimated using one-step lookahead (and, thus, there is a need to
approximate the probabilities of future agreements). In brief, VPI-over-OSLA proceeds as
follows:
1. The“true”q-valuesofanypotentialagreement  arecalculated,assumingone-steplook-
ahead and calculation of the V 0
i and Q0
i values of the successor belief state (following
the revelation of the true t 
C) through Eqs. 9 and 10.
2. The gain from reaching agreement   is calculated via Eq. 12, where the values q1 and
q2 of the best and second-best actions are calculated through Eqs. 8, 9 and 10.
3. The VPI for   is calculated via Eq. 13.
4. The Q-values QVi for (any)   are calculated through Eq. 15 (and are subsequently used
in the coalition formation process).
4.3 Myopic Bayesian RL algorithm
A very simple RL algorithm is the myopic Bayesian RL algorithm. It is purely myopic, with
agents reasoning only about the immediate value of coalitional agreements and ignoring the
value of any future coalitions or the evolution their belief states. An agent i using myopic
Bayesian RL computes the value of an agreement given belief state Bi, as follows:
Qi(C, ,dC, Bi) = ri
 
tC TC
Bi(tC)
 
s
Pr(s| ,tC)R(s).
4.4 Maximum a posteriori type assignment RL algorithm
Another relatively simple, but sometimes effective algorithm is the maximum a posteriori
typeassignment(MAP)algorithm.Thisalgorithmeffectivelyreducestheproblemofestimat-
ing the Q-values of agreements given an agent’s beliefs about opponent types to the problem
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of estimating Q-values about agreements given a speciﬁc opponent type vector, namely, the
most probable type vector given its beliefs.
More precisely, given belief state Bi, agent i assumes that the actual type ti
j of opponent
j is the most probable type: ti
j = argmaxtj Bi(tj). The vector of types tC assumed by i
for any coalition C is deﬁned in this way, giving the following estimate of the value of any
agreement:
Qi(C, ,dC|tC) = ri
 
s
Pr(s| ,tC)R(s)
Notice that this calculation is myopic, not accounting for the sequential value of an agree-
ment. However, the sequential value of agreement under the MAP type assumption is simply
the discounted sum of the (best) myopic agreement value: with type uncertainty is assumed
away, there is no need for belief update or negotiation under type uncertainty.
5 Combining RL algorithms with the coalition formation process
It is easy to deﬁne variants of our Bayesian RL algorithms, in order to accommodate dif-
ferent environment requirements. What is more, we can partition the space of the possible
variants of RL algorithms by examining their combination with various coalition formation
processes.Forexample,wecanconsiderthefollowingfourclassesofreinforcementlearners,
combining Q-value estimation with dynamic formation (or negotiation) processes.
The ﬁrst are non-myopic/full negotiation (NM-FN) agents. Agents in this class employ
full negotiation when forming coalitions, attempting to ﬁnd a stable (e.g., Bayesian core)
structure and allocation before engaging in their actions. For instance, they might use the
dynamic process described above to determine suitable coalitions given their current beliefs.
Furthermore, they employ sequential reasoning (using the OSLA or the VPI RL method, for
example), in their attempt to solve the POMDP described by Eqs. 6 and 7.
Myopic/fullnegotiation(M-FN)agentsusefullnegotiationtodeterminecoalitionsateach
stage. However, they do not reason about future (belief) states when assessing the value of
coalitional moves. Essentially, M-FN agents engage in repeated application of a coalition
formation process (such as BRE), myopically choose actions, and repeat.
Myopic/one-step proposers (M-OSP) are agents that are myopic regarding the use of their
beliefs when estimating coalition values (like M-FN), but do not employ full negotiation to
form coalitions. Rather, at each stage of the RL process, one random proposer is assumed
to be chosen, and once a proposal has been made and accepted or rejected, no further nego-
tiations are assumed to take place: the coalitional action is assumed to be executed after a
single proposal. Finally, non-myopic/one-step proposers (NM-OSP) are, naturally, the obvi-
ous combination of NM-FN and M-OSP agents. Notice that the fact that OSP agents assume
(from an RL perspective) that the negotiation process has only one round, does not neces-
sarily mean that the actual negotiations will last for just one round. Specifically, an agent
may deliberate about the value of various agreements by supposing one-step negotiation, to
simplify its reasoning. This is possible even if the actual negotiation uses multiple rounds.
Nevertheless, in our experiments, all OSP agents simulations involve actual negotiations that
last for one round.
FN approaches have the advantage that at the end of each RL stage, before actions are
executed, the coalition structure is in a stable state (depending on the nature of the coalition
formation process). Another advantage of FN is that agents have the opportunity to update
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theirbeliefsregardingotheragents’stypesduringthenegotiationitself.6 However,FN-meth-
ods generally do not permit agents to fully explore the full space of coalitions or actions: at
the end of each stage, the agents will indeed have strong information on a sub-space of the
coalition structure space, specifically the subspace that contains the stable coalition structure
the agents have led themselves into; but the agents may not have the opportunity to explore
coalition structures that are unreachable given their beliefs (since if they reach a stable struc-
ture, they have little interest in further exploration). This is in contrast to OSP approaches,
which may potentially provide the agents with more ﬂexibility to investigate the whole space
of structures.
6 Experimental evaluation
WeconductthreesetsofexperimentstoevaluatethedifferentRLmethodsandcomputational
approximations proposed above. Evaluation includes varying the nature of the negotiation
process by examining distinctions between the full negotiation and one-step proposals for
coalition formation during the stage games. In all cases, we measure the total discounted
reward accumulated by all agents to measure the quality of the coalitions formed, and exam-
ine their evolution over time. We also examine “convergence” behaviour is some cases, to
test whether stable coalitions are formed, and to look at quality of performance after learning
has stabilized. For reasons discussed above, solving POMDPs for problems of this scope is
impractical, as is the formulation of a BEFG for our model. Hence we are unable to compare
our approximations to an “exact” solution.
Theﬁrstsetofexperimentsexaminestheperformanceofourlearningmethodswithagents
that face the same coalition formation problem—specifically with the same action dynam-
ics and reward model—at each stage (though with different beliefs). The second considers
dynamic tasks, in which the actions and rewards vary at each stage; this will demonstrate
the ability of our RL framework and methods to support knowledge transfer across tasks
through its focus on type learning. The third set of experiments compares our methods to an
adaptation of a successful algorithm for coalition formation under uncertainty proposed in
the literature [34].
The process used during the coalition formation stages is the BRE dynamic process [12]
for BCFPs. In estimating Q-values, we sample type vectors rather than exhaustively enu-
merating them all as follows. Let |T| be the number of types and |C| the size of coalition
in question. If |T||C|   1000, no sampling is used; otherwise, 100 type vectors are sampled
according the belief distribution.
6.1 Static tasks
We ﬁrst test our approach in two related static settings, i.e., in which the action dynamics
and rewards are identical at each stage. This can be viewed as agents facing the same choice
of tasks throughout the RL process. In both settings, coalitions have three actions available,
each with three possible stochastic outcomes depending on the coalition’s type vector. In the
ﬁrst setting, ﬁve agents and ﬁve types are used; in the second, ten agents and ten types.
6 We do not explore this possibility in our experiments, in order to focus on the RL aspects of the repeated
coalition formation problem, rather than those of bargaining. We note, however, that one can devise meth-
ods that make use of the update of beliefs while observing the opponents’s responses to proposals. See, for
example, [13].
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Intuitively, the agents form companies to bid for software development projects. There
are three agent roles, corresponding to project roles, each having three or four quality levels,
with the combination of role and quality determining an agent’s type: interface designer =
 bad,average,expert , programmer = bad,average,good,expert  and systems engi-
neer = bad,average,expert . The quality levels correspond to quality “points” (0 points
for bad, and increasing by 1 for each quality increment), and the overall quality of a coalition
isthesumofthesepoints.Agentsknowtheroleoftheiropponents,butnottheirqualitylevels.
Companies (coalitions) can bid for a large, medium or small projects (actions), and they can
make large, average or small profits (outcomes), depending on the bid and the members’s
types. The outcome (and subsequent coalitional reward) of an action depends on the quality
of the coalition. A coalition can (with high probability) receive large profits by bidding on a
large project only if its total quality is high and there is sufﬁcient diversity of roles amongst
its members. A coalition with two (respectively, more) members is “punished” if it does not
have two (resp., at least 3) members with different roles, by receiving only a fraction of the
reward it is entitled to given the quality of its members. Tables 6, 9, and 10 in Appendix
A illustrate the dynamics of the problem and rewards. Reward shares that the members of
size two coalitions can expect to receive are equal to their reward for acting alone, but less
if the two-member coalition is made up of members with the same role. Thus agents using
a Myopic method will ﬁnd it hard to form size two coalitions (starting from a conﬁguration
structure of singletons), even if in fact these coalitions can serve as the “building blocks” for
more promising ones.
Tables 7 and 8 in Appendix A shows the types of the agents in both the ﬁve and ten-agent
experiments. The ﬁve-agent environment is such that the (classic deterministic) core is non-
empty, while the 10-agent environment has an empty core. Within each environment, we
consider two distinct settings, one in which agents have a uniform prior over (quality) types
of opponents, and one with a misinformed prior—in this case agents believe with probability
0.7 that each of its opponents has a type different than its actual.
Agents are homogeneous in the sense that each employs the same learning algorithm in
any given setting. Each experiment consists of 30 runs, each with 500 RL steps. A discount
factorof0.985isusedinallexperiments.Wheneverafullnegotiation(FN)approachisused,
formation negotiations last for 50 rounds (per RL stage). Agents observe only the results of
the action taken by their coalition, not those of any other coalition, and only update beliefs
about their partners at any speciﬁc stage.
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 plot the discounted reward accumulated by the coalitions in each
homogeneous environment consisting of Myopic, OSLA, VPI, MAP, or VPI-over-OSLA
agents (averaged over 30 runs). In addition, Tables 3 and 4 report the average “per step”
reward accumulated during the ﬁnal 50 RL steps, once agents’s beliefs and behaviour are
expected to have stabilized. For comparison against an optimal (nonlearning) benchmark,
we also tested the behaviour of agents who knew the exact types of each agent (i.e., were
fully informed): total discounted average reward (over 30 runs) after 500 iterations is shown
in Table 2 (not plotted for legibility reasons). In the 5-agent case, the structure (and actions)
agreed upon by the fully informed agents is optimal (i.e., with maximum expected collective
payoff) and core-stable.
In the ﬁve-agent experiments (Figs. 1, 2), we see that VPI tends to be the best performing
algorithm (with the exception of uniform priors, full negotiation, Fig. 1b), though the advan-
tage over MAP is not statistically significant in the one-step proposal settings. Myopic con-
sistently performs worst. Interestingly, MAP performs reasonably well, beating all other
methods with uniform priors and full negotiation. MAP effectively employs a crude form
of exploration, with agents behaving in an overly optimistic or pessimistic manner w.r.t. the
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Table 2 Discounted average (over 30 runs) total accumulated payoffs after 500 RL steps for fully informed
agents employing either FN or OSP formation algorithms
Fully informed agents 5 agents 10 agents
Full negotiation 183713 258726
One-step proposals 139965 226490
value of information they receive: a slight modiﬁcation of their beliefs may “point” to a
completely different partner. This turns out to be helpful in the ﬁve-agent setting, since roles
are known, and type uncertainty limited to only 3 or 4 unknown quality levels; furthermore,
the reward signal is quite clear regarding the quality of coalitions. Hence, MAP agents are
able to quickly determine which partners have good quality types and stick to their choices.
In fact, MAP agents manage to achieve high reward without ever reducing type uncertainty
regarding most of their potential partners. Deﬁne D(x, y) = 1   Bx(ty =  y) to be the
distance between x’s beliefs about the type  y of agent y and y’s true type. We observe
distances of approximately 0.75 or 0.66667 regularly at the end of RL stage 500 with MAP
agents, which coincides with the initial distances prior to stage 1.
In the ﬁve agent-full negotiation experiments we also plot the “BC-Stable Conﬁguration”
curve corresponding to reward accumulated by a group of agents that are placed in a strong
Bayesian core conﬁguration (w.r.t. their initial beliefs) at each stage (i.e., with no renego-
tiation or learning involved). This BC-stable conﬁguration is quite rewarding (though not
optimal). With both uniform and misinformed priors (Fig. 1a, b), we see that VPI agents
performing substantially better agents statically placed in the Bayesian core. (The plot is
identical in the one-step proposer cases and is not shown.)
Ourresultsindicatethatagentsusingfullnegotiationaremoresuccessfulthanthoseusing
one-step proposals by a wide margin (from 2–4 times better performance in most cases). The
fact that FN agents engage in lengthy dynamic formation processes at each RL stage enables
them to reach more stable conﬁgurations (as these are to a greater extent the product of
“collective consensus,” and likely closer to more rewarding states). The more “exploratory”
nature of OSP agents is also evident when observing the error bars in these ﬁgures. Never-
theless, Tables 3 and 4 shows that OSP agents do eventually match the performance of FN
agents in the stage games. In fact, in the ﬁve-agent settings (Table 3), they consistently (with
the exception of MAP-Uni) achieve per-stage reward which is higher than that gathered by
their FN counterparts. Thus, the more exploratory nature of OSP agents pays beneﬁts in the
long run—but at the expense of performance while learning.
In the ten-agent experiments, with a larger number of agents and a more complicated
environment, VPI establishes itself as the most successful of our methods, both in terms of
discounted accumulated reward (Figs. 3, 4) and per-stage reward once agent beliefs have
“converged” (Table 4). VPI accumulates 76.9% of the average discounted reward earned
by fully informed agents in the misinformed priors-full negotiation case (and 74.5% in the
uniform priors-full negotiation case). One important observation is that VPI agents achieve
good performance without, in most cases, significantly reducing their type uncertainty. For
example,intheexperimentsshowninFig.3b,inmostcases D(x, y)rangesfrom0.5to0.96
at the end of stage 500. (To be more exact, only 8 out of the 90 possible runs—since we have
10 agentswithbeliefsabout9possiblepartners—had D(x, y)lessthan0.5.)Thisillustrates
the point that it is not always necessary for agents to explicitly reduce total uncertainty, but
only relevant uncertainty, to achieve good performance.
Our results, especially those involving ten agents, show that OSLA and VPI-over-OSLA
perform poorly w.r.t. discounted accumulated reward. We attribute this to the strong assump-
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(b) Misinformed priors
Fig. 1 Experiments with ﬁve agents, full negotiation. Discounted average total payoff accumulated by coali-
tions (in 30 runs). Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. The “BC-Stable conﬁguration” is a non-optimal
one, and involves no learning. The discounted average accumulated payoff for an optimal core-stable conﬁg-
uration at step 500 is as shown in Table 2 (i.e., 183,713)
tions and minimal lookahead of OSLA, though it is notable that VPI-over-OSLA consis-
tently achieves better performance than OSLA. Interestingly, the performance of OSLA and
VPI-over-OSLA in the ﬁnal RL stages (Tables 3, 4) is often comparable (and in some cases
superior) to that of methods that fare better w.r.t. discounted accumulated reward. Unsur-
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(b) Misinformed priors
Fig. 2 Experiments with ﬁve agents, one-step proposals. Discounted average total payoff accumulated by
coalitions (in 30 runs). Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals. The discounted average accumulated payoff
for an optimal core-stable conﬁguration at step 500 is as shown in Table 2 (i.e., 139,965)
prisingly, Myopic usually exhibits poor performance—it is far too cautious, and unable to
progressively building profitable coalitions.
With regard to the stability of the coalitions formed in the 5-agent setting, VPI, OSLA,
VPI-over-OSLA, and Myopic agents frequently ﬁnd themselves in a BC conﬁguration while
learning (i.e., at the end of formation stages, before executing coalitional actions), even if
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(b) Misinformed priors
Fig. 3 Experiments with ten agents, full negotiation. Discounted average total payoff accumulated by coali-
tions (in 30 runs). Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals
they do not “converge” to one. Convergence results are shown in Table 5.7 Convergence is
assumed if a least 50 consecutive RL trials before ﬁnal stage resulted in a BC conﬁguration.
MAP agents managed to converge to the rewarding stable conﬁgurations quite often (and
7 Whenwetriedsomerunsfor10000RLsteps,themethodsdidseemtobeabletoconvergetoBCallocations
more often.
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Fig. 4 Experiments with ten agents, one-step proposals. Discounted average total payoff accumulated by
coalitions (in 30 runs). Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals
this contributed to their good performance in the uniform priors-full negotiations case.) With
ten agents, the core is empty so convergence is not measurable.
While MAP exhibits reasonable performance, these result suggest that VPI is the superior
method for reinforcement learning in repeated coalition formation. Further, VPI is much
more computationally effective than the other methods.
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Table 3 Experiments with 5
agents. Average “per step”
reward accumulated within the
ﬁnal 50 RL steps of a run. Uni,
uniform, Mis, misinformed prior
Method Reward
(a) Full negotiations
Fully informed agents 2992.82
VPI-Uni 1503.08 (50.23%)
VPI-Mis 1387.28 (46.35%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Uni 873.74 (29.19%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Mis 783.44 (26.18%)
OSLA-Uni 860.72 (28.76%)
OSLA-Mis 807.18 (26.97%)
MAP-Uni 2745.6 (91.73%)
MAP-Mis 1218.24 (40.7%)
Myopic-Uni 824.96 (27.56%)
Myopic-Mis 1046.64 (34.97%)
(b) One-step proposals
Fully informed agents 2392.54
VPI-Uni 1611.4 (67.35%)
VPI-Mis 1562 (65.29%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Uni 1063.14 (44.44%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Mis 973.92 (40.71%)
OSLA-Uni 1562.86 (65.32%)
OSLA-Mis 1253.8 (52.4%)
MAP-Uni 1588.6 (66.4%)
MAP-Mis 1459.4 (61%)
Myopic-Uni 674.44 (28.2%)
Myopic-Mis 723.76 (30.25%)
6.2 Dynamic tasks
We know consider a setting in which agents face dynamic tasks, in other words, where the
possible coalitional actions, their dynamics, or their rewards can change from stage to stage
of the repeated interaction. Such dynamic tasks [32, 37, 51, 54] are an important aspect of
coalition andteam formation. The ability ofourRL framework to allowagents to learn about
the types of other agents facilitates the transfer of knowledge between tasks. Indeed, this is
oneofthemajorbeneﬁtsofamodelthatassumestypeuncertaintyanduseslearningtotackle
it: once agents learn about the abilities of partners, they can re-use this knowledge when
encountering those partners under different circumstances.
We test this ability in a setting with ﬁve agents (again, homogeneous in the RL method
used), which form coalitions over 500 stages. Coalitions are formed using the BRE method
(50 full negotiation steps). There are ﬁve types, each agent having a distinct type (different
from the other four) but not aware of this constraint. Agents share a uniform prior regarding
the types of their opponents (but know their own types). Coalitions have three actions at their
disposal with three possible outcomes each. However, the outcome probabilities vary from
one RL stage to another (see below) reﬂecting different tasks or environments. We assume
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Table 4 Experiments with 10
agents. Average “per step”
reward accumulated within the
ﬁnal 50 RL steps of a run. Uni
uniform, Mis misinformed prior
Method Reward
(a) Full negotiations
Fully informed agents 3884.77
VPI-Uni 2987.6 (76.9%)
VPI-Mis 2893.6 (74.48%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Uni 1622.5 (41.76%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Mis 1768.86 (45.53%)
OSLA-Uni 1564.6 (40.27%)
OSLA-Mis 1669.4 (42.97%)
MAP-Uni 2736 (70.42%)
MAP-Mis 2144.34 (55.2%)
Myopic-Uni 2419.4 (62.28%)
Myopic-Mis 2235.2 (57.54%)
(b) One-step proposals
Fully informed agents 3881.7
VPI-Uni 2764.2 (71.21%)
VPI-Mis 2736.4 (70.49%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Uni 1642.88 (42.32%)
VPI-over-OSLA-Mis 1710.96 (44.08%)
OSLA-Uni 1542.4 (39.74%)
OSLA-Mis 1541.8 (39.72%)
MAP-Uni 2657.58 (68.46%)
MAP-Mis 1660.7 (42.78%)
Myopic-Uni 1078.68 (27.8%)
Myopic-Mis 1462.8 (37.68%)
Table 5 The convergence to BC
results (converged/30 runs) for
the algorithms (for 5 agents).
“Convergence” is assumed if at
least 50 consecutive RL trials
before a run’s termination result
in a BC conﬁguration
FN Unif. FN
Misinf.
OSP
Unif.
OSP
Misinf.
MAP 27/30 0/30 14/30 0/30
Myopic 0/30 0/30 1/30 2/30
VPI 0/30 0/30 1/30 3/30
OSLA 0/30 0/30 2/30 2/30
VPI-over-OSLA 0/30 0/30 0/30 0/30
agents know which task they will face at which stage so that the dynamics of the underlying
POMDP is known and can be factored into the Bellman equations.8
8 The tasks at each stage need not be known with certainty; a distribution over tasks is sufﬁcient to apply our
model. If the task distribution is not known, the POMDP model will break down. However, we can still apply
our methods as we discuss later in this section.
123Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst
Fig. 5 The good, the bad and the ugly
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Fig. 6 Transfer of knowledge setup: discounted accumulated reward results
The precise set up is as follows: the agents are ﬁve bandits in the Wild West trying to form
asuccessfulgang.Theultimategoalofthethreeagentsoftypes“Good”,“Bad”and“Ugly”is
to discover each other and come together to “Rob the Train” (coalitional action), so as to get
the “Big Money” (outcome). Before doing so, they will go through an experience-gathering
phase, during which it is possible to coalesce with other villains (“El Viejo” and “Sancho
Villa”), performing “petit crime” actions of lesser significance (such as “Rob Cornerstore”
or “Rob Saloon”) which may result in “Some Change” or “Some Decent Cash” (outcomes)
states—given the coalition qualities and underlying stochasticity. The setup is summarized
in Fig. 5.
During the experience-gathering phase, i.e., the ﬁrst 400 RL stages, the bandits are faced
with problems 1 and 2 in an alternating fashion, with each problem having its own, distinct
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Fig. 7 Transfer of knowledge setup: rewards gathered during the “Big Crime” phase (averaged over 30 runs)
outcome transition model. They face problem 3 during the last 100 RL stages: this is the
“Big Crime” phase of the experiment). By the time stage 401 is reached, they should have
gained enough experience to form good coalitions to tackle problem 3 (through identifying
each other correctly) and fare well in their “Big Crime;” if not, they will only make “Some
Change” during this phase. Specifically, if all of them form a coalition and decide to rob the
train, they have 85% probability of making Big Money; if only two of them form a coalition,
theycanexpect,with80%probability,tomakeSomeDecentCashbytakingthatsameaction.
Problems 1 and 2, by contrast, suggest that agents should form two-agent coalitions, so that
they get information regarding their partners’s types.
Results are presented in Figs. 6 and 7. VPI dominates the other methods both in terms of
discounted accumulated rewards (i.e., behaviour during the “experience-gathering” phase),
and also in terms of accumulated rewards during the ﬁnal phase of the experiment. Perfor-
mance of the lookahead methods and Myopic are not unreasonable, but clearly worse than
VPI (and none get the same bump in performance during the big crime phase experienced by
VPI). MAP agents appear to be utterly confused by the setup. These results illustrate that our
framework, and the VPI algorithm specifically, supports the transfer of learned knowledge
in coalition formation across different tasks/settings.
We repeated the experiment with the following change: agents are now unaware of the
order in which they would be presented with tasks (in other words, they cannot predict what
action transition model will be in place at any stage except the current one). In order to facil-
itate the computation required by lookahead methods, each agent assumes that the current
transition model will be encountered. In this model, OSLA and VPI-over-OSLA agents are
unable to accurately evaluate 1-step Q-values, since they have incorrect beliefs regarding the
coalition formation problem to be faced at their successor belief states.
Results are presented in Figs. 8 and 9. Again VPI dominates the other methods in all
respects. Unsurprisingly, OSLA and VPI-over-OSLA fare much more poorly given their
inability to accurately evaluate Q-values. Nevertheless, the OSLA and VPI-over-OSLA
agents do manage to collect, in the last phase of the experiment, approximately 10 and 6
times more reward, respectively, than the MAP agents; hence they still exhibit some knowl-
edge transfer.
6.3 Comparison to kernel-based coalition formation
While no existing work prior to ours combines dynamic coalition formation with learning
undertypeuncertainty,Krausetal.[34]havedealtwithcoalitionformationunderuncertainty
over coalitional values in a speciﬁc domain.9 Though their method is better tailored to set-
9 We explain the domain details later in Sect. 7.
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Fig. 8 The good, the bad and the ugly: discounted accumulated reward results
Fig. 9 The good, the bad and the ugly: rewards gathered during the “Big Crime” phase (averaged over 30
runs)
tingsfocusingonsocialwelfaremaximization,itisarareexampleofadiscountedcoalitional
bargaining method under a restricted form of uncertainty, which combines heuristics with
principled game theoretic techniques.
WecompareourBayesianRLmethodswithanalgorithminspiredbytheworkKrausetal.
[34]. We adapt their method to our repeated coalition setting with type uncertainty, referring
to the modiﬁcation as the KST algorithm. The method essentially computes an approxima-
tion of a kernel-stable allocation for coalitions that are formed during the negotiation phase
of the RL process, with agents intentionally compromising part of their payoff to success-
fully form coalitions. The level of compromise is determined by a “compromise factor,” and
following [34], our KST algorithm uses a compromise factor of 0.8. We assume no central
authority,andhaveonlyoneagentproposingperround,withcoalitionvaluesestimatedgiven
type uncertainty.
A direct comparison of our techniques with [34] would not be appropriate, since it uses
no learning and is not designed to handle type uncertainty and other aspects of our setting
(e.g., that work makes certain heuristic assumptions which are inappropriate here, such as
computing the kernel for the coalition with the greatest coalitional value, even though this
might not at all be the coalition ensuring the highest payoff to the agent). Nevertheless, after
some adaptations, it can serve as a useful benchmark, exhibiting the beneﬁts of learning ver-
sus non-learning approaches to repeated coalition formation. We also combined KST with
our Myopic RL algorithm, treating KST as its dynamic coalition formation component, in
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Fig. 10 Setup for the fourth set of experiments (comparison to the KST method)
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Fig. 11 Comparison with the (adapted) KST coalition formation approach. “KST(learning)” is Myopic RL
having KST as its coalition formation component. The y axis shows discounted average accumulated reward
gathered in 30 runs
an attempt to assess whether there are any clear distinctions between core-based or kernel-
based coalition formation in our RL setting. In this respect, we can view KST as a myopic
RL method, using kernel-stable payoff allocations and compromise [34].
We compared these methods on a setting with ﬁve agents, ﬁve types, and each agent
having a different type. The setup is shown in Fig. 10. Agents have uniform prior beliefs.
We compare KST (with and without learning) to our VPI method (since this is the method
that performed best in the preceding experiments) and to Myopic (since KST is essentially
a myopic method). As above, 50 negotiation steps are used to form coalitions, and we run
the process for 1000 RL stages (30 runs). Results are shown in Fig. 11. Clearly, VPI (using
BRE)isthebestmethodinthisdomain,achievingtotaldiscountedrewardcloseto50%ofthe
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maximumachievablebyfullyinformedagents..Whenagentsusenolearning,performanceis
very poor: KST (no learning) achieves negligible reward. Myopic RL seems to work equally
well whether a core-based (BRE) or a kernel-based coalition formation process is used (the
core-based approach does marginally, but not significantly, better).
7 Related work
In this section we review some related work from both the AI and game theory communities
and, where appropriate highlight, the differences from our work.
Shehory and Kraus [51, 52] develop coalition formation algorithms which account for
the capabilities of agents. However, agents rely on information communicated to them by
their potential partners in order to form initial estimates of the capabilities of others. Pay-
off allocation is addressed in [52], where they present two algorithms for self-interested
agentsinnon-superadditiveenvironments.Thealgorithmsdealdirectlywithexpectedpayoff
allocation,andthecoalitionformationmechanismsusedarebasedonthekernelstabilitycon-
cept. Shehory et al. [53] also assume communication to inform agents of the capabilities of
partners, and develop coalition formation algorithms to achieve agent collaboration in the
RETSINA framework, so that tasks of common interest are executed successfully. This work
focuses on serving the needs of the team (i.e., social welfare) and does not deal with payoff
allocation issues.
Kraus et al. [33, 34] propose heuristic methods for coalition formation in a “Request for
Proposal” domain, modeling a restricted form of coalitional value uncertainty (as opposed
to agent type uncertainty). In the RFP domain, agents come together to perform tasks com-
prised of subtasks, each to be performed by a different agent. The agents may not know the
value of a subtask to another agent or the cost of performing it, but they know the overall
payoff associated with performing a task and the capabilities of the other agents. A kernel-
based approach is combined with the use of “compromises” for the payoff allocation. Their
focus is again social-welfare maximization rather than individual rationality. Furthermore,
no learning is involved and repeated coalition formation is not addressed.
Campos and Willmott [37] address iterative coalition formation. They deﬁne “iterative
coalition games” in which different agents may possess different abilities that will collec-
tivelyenablecoalitionstocompleteataskthatdoesnotchangeovertime.Agentsareinitially
assigned to coalitions randomly. They do not concern themselves with the payoff allocation
problem; instead, they use several pre-deﬁned strategies for choosing coalition formation
moves, based essentially on whether their current coalition is “winning” over several rounds
of play. Those limitations make the approach basically static, and there is no attempt to
employlearningtofacilitatecoalitionformation.Bycontrast,AbdallahandLesser[1]utilize
reinforcement learning in their approach to “organization-based coalition formation.” They
assume an underlying organization guides the coalition formation process, and Q-learning is
used to optimize the decisions of coalition managers, who assess communication or action-
processing costs. However, agents are assumed to be cooperative, and there is no attempt
to solve the payoff allocation problem. Furthermore, managers are assumed to possess full
knowledge of their “child” agents’s capabilities.
Banerjee and Sen [4] address uncertainty regarding payoffs to members entering a coa-
lition. The authors do not concern themselves with the process of coalition formation itself
or payoff allocation, but rather address only with the problem of “coalition selection”: an
agent has imperfect summary information of the anticipated payoff for joining a coalition,
and has to choose one coalition over another after a ﬁxed number of allowed interactions
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with them. This “summary information” is provided by a payoff-structure encoding in the
form of a multinomial distribution over possible payoffs for joining the coalition. The pro-
posed mechanism for choosing a coalition makes use of this distribution, and also employs
an arbitration mechanism from voting theory to resolve ties. In the case of limited allowed
interactions,theproposedmechanismnotablyoutperformsamaximizationofexpectedutility
mechanism in terms of selecting the most beneﬁcial coalition. If the interactions allowed are
inﬁnite, however, the former mechanism reduces to the latter.
Klusch and Gerber [32] design and implement a simulation-based dynamic coalition for-
mation scheme which can be instantiated using different computational methods and nego-
tiation protocols. Their framework can be employed for the development, implementation
andexperimentalevaluationofdifferentcoalitionformationandpayoffallocationalgorithms
(even fuzzy or stochastic coalition formation environments). Several different algorithms for
learning of optimal coalition coalitions using Bayesian and RL methods are explored as well
[27].AsdiscussedinSect.2,Blankenburgetal. [9]introducetheconceptofthefuzzykernel
to cope with uncertain coalition values in sequential, bilateral coalition negotiations. More
recently,BlankenburgandKlusch[8]proposeacoalitionformationalgorithmwhichenables
agents to negotiate bilateral Shapley value-stable coalitions in uncertain environments. Both
approaches, however, are restricted to static, non-adaptive coalition forming in uncertain
environments. By contrast, Blankenburg et al. [7] have implemented a coalition formation
process that allows the agents to progressively update trust values regarding others, by com-
municating their private estimates regarding task costs and coalition valuations. They use
encryption-based techniques and develop a payment protocol that ensures agents have the
incentive to truthfully report their valuations. However, the proposed mechanism involves
extensive inter-agent communication, and its effectiveness relies on computing optimal coa-
lition structures and kernel stable solutions (both intensive computationally). Our approach
could incorporate theirs as the internal coalition formation “stage” of the larger RL process
(though some extension would be necessary to allow for the overlapping coalitions their
model admits).
In contrast to some of the methods described above, agents in our framework have the
ability not only to dynamically choose the tasks they wish to tackle, but also to choose the
proper way (action) to deal with them. The incorporation of task execution in our model can
be realized by simply viewing the tasks as requiring the use of speciﬁc action sets. Tasks can
be thought of as deﬁning a relevant action set at a speciﬁc stage of the RL process, specif-
ically, triggering the existence of those actions that could be used to accomplish the task in
question. Therefore, we can abstract away tasks, folding them into the speciﬁcation of action
sets.Finally,wenotethatourapproachcanbeusedtoenableagentstoformthemostsuitable
coalitions for a new problem “online” in the sense that knowledge acquired during execution
ofonetaskcanbereadily“transferred”toanotherasshownintheprevioussection.Thus,the
agents do not require experience with a new problem before deciding on ways to attack it.
8 Conclusions
We have proposed a Bayesian multiagent reinforcement learning framework for (repeated)
coalition formation under type uncertainty. The framework enables the agents to improve
their ability to form useful coalitions through the experience gained by repeated interaction
withothersandobservationoftheeffectsofcoalitionalactions.Agentsinourmodelmaintain
and update beliefs about the types of others, and make sequentially rational decisions that
reﬂect their interests, accounting for both potential coalition formation activities, and the
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potential choice of actions by the coalitions they join. We developed a POMDP formulation
thatenablesagentstoassessthelong-termvalueofcoalitionformationdecisions,accounting
for: the value of potential collective actions, uncertainty regarding both the types of others
and the outcomes of coalitional actions, and the need to choose actions and coalitions not
only for their immediate value, but also for their value of information.
Our RL framework is generic, allowing the agents to dynamically form coalitions, serve
tasks and transfer knowledge between them. Critically, our framework enables the agents
to weigh their need to explore the abilities of their potential partners against their need
to exploit knowledge acquired so far. Specifically, coalition participants are able to make
informed, sequentially rational decisions (regarding both the bargaining and the coalitional
actions to take, and taking into account the value of information of the various actions), bal-
ancing exploration of actions with exploitation of knowledge in repeated coalition formation
scenarios.Ourframeworkcaninprincipleaccommodateanyunderlyingnegotiationprocess,
and is not tightly bound to any speciﬁc cooperative solution or equilibrium concept.
We developed and evaluated several RL algorithms, each based on different computa-
tional approximations or assumptions. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our
Bayesian approach, and of the concrete RL algorithms, under a variety of assumptions. Our
BayesianVPItechnique,inparticular,provedtobeveryrobust,outperformingothermethods
consistently, and exhibiting very good computational performance. It works well with both
full negotiation and one-step proposals, under conditions of high stochasticity, and when the
initial beliefs held by agents is poor or misleading. Furthermore, it supports the effective
transfer of knowledge among diverse tasks.
In future work, we intend to test our algorithms in open distributed environments. More
specifically, experimenting in such environments with a greater variety of problem sizes, and
different degrees of accuracy of agents’s prior beliefs is of interest, as is experimenting with
multi-step lookahead methods.
We believe our framework and algorithms are well-suited to realistic, complex task allo-
cation environments, such as environments requiring the formation of coalitions to provide
services in the computational grid [40] under time constraints that will not admit intensive
computation [51]. In these settings, we expect VPI to be the preferred technique for several
reasons. Our lookahead approaches have intense computational requirements and are not
well-suited to such settings. Furthermore, in a variety of settings, priors may be uninfor-
mative and transition models may not be particularly discriminative (i.e., may not strongly
distinguish the types of team members). Our experiments showed Myopic or MAP agents to
perform poorly in such situations. In contrast, VPI appears to be far more robust, balancing
value of information with immediate payoff. Consequently, we expect VPI to prove to be
superior in realistic, repeated coalition formation environments. Indeed, these ideas were
recently recast in a large computational trust setting by Teacy et al. [59], who report very
encouragingresultswhenapplyingourmethodtotheexploration–exploitationproblemfaced
by Bayesian agents that have to choose trusted information providers over time in a sequen-
tially optimal manner. A variant of our VPI algorithm, assuming a continuous type space,
was shown there to dramatically outperform all ﬁnalists in the 2006 and 2007 International
Agent Reputation and Trust Competition [26]. Their experiments, involving up to 60 agents,
showed VPI to operate in near-linear time.
Tohandlelarge-scaleproblems,anotherinterestingdirectionistheextensionofourmodel
to include reasoning about the cost of computation [29, 46] as part of the inferential process.
An agent using an approximate method for inference might specify the cost of improving
that approximation by using more computation. The computation thus would have a value,
arising as the expected gains or losses incurred by its use.
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Theoretical directions include extending the model to include simultaneous learning of
typesandtransition/rewardmodels.Despiteitsintractabilityingeneral,wearealsointerested
indevelopingafullBayesianextensiveformgameformulationoftherepeatedcoalitionprob-
lem for speciﬁc forms of coalitional bargaining, analyzing its equilibria—at least in certain
simple cases—and developing practical computational approximations.
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Appendix A: Experimental parameters from Sect. 6.1
See Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
Table 6 Symbols used in tables
describing transition functions
(for the ﬁrst experimental setting
in Sect. 6)
a: “action”; s: “state”; q: quality points;  : any;
N: number of coalition members
penalty = N   0.1: penalty to discourage employing “cheap” workers
NMT: number of different “major” types present in coalition
SP: small proﬁt state;
AP: average proﬁt state;
LP: large proﬁt state
BFS: bid for small project action;
BFA: bid for average project action;
BFL: bid for large project action
Table 7 Participants in the
ﬁve-agent experiments
Agent Type Quality points
0 Expert interface designer 2
1 Good programmer 2
2 Expert systems engineer 2
3 Bad programmer 0
4 Bad systems engineer 0
Table 8 Participants in the
ten-agent experiments
Agent Type Quality points
0 Expert interface designer 2
1 Good programmer 2
2 Expert systems engineer 2
3 Bad programmer 0
4 Bad systems engineer 0
5 Bad interface designer 0
6 Average interface designer 1
7 Average programmer 1
8 Average systems engineer 1
9 Bad programmer 0
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Table 9 Outcome transition function for 5-agent environments (for the ﬁrst experimental setting in Sect. 6)
1-member coal. Pr(LP|a = ,q) = 0
Pr(AP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.02
Pr(AP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.01
Pr(AP|a = BFL,q) = 0
Pr(SP|a,q) = 1   Pr(AP|a,q)
2-member coal. if NMT < 2 then q = q/2
Pr(LP|a = ,q) = 0
Pr(AP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.04
Pr(AP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.02
Pr(AP|a = BFL,q) = 0
Pr(SP|a,q) = 1   Pr(AP|a,q)
3-member coal. if NMT < 3 then: if NMT = 1 then q = q/3
if NMT = 2 then q = q/2
Pr(LP|a = ,q) = 0
Pr(AP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.06
Pr(AP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.02
Pr(AP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.01
Pr(SP|a,q) = 1   Pr(AP|a,q)
if NMT = 3 then: Pr(LP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.01
Pr(LP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.04
Pr(LP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.05
Pr(SP|a,q) = (1   Pr(LP|a,q))/(q + 1)
Pr(AP|a,q) = 1   Pr(LP|a,q)   Pr(SP|a,q)
4 or 5-member coal. if NMT < 3 then: if NMT = 1 then q = q/3
if NMT = 2 then q = q/2
Pr(LP|a = ,q) = 0
Pr(AP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.03
Pr(AP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.05
Pr(AP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.03
Pr(SP|a,q) = 1   Pr(AP|a,q)
if NMT = 3 then: Pr(LP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.01
Pr(LP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.04
Pr(LP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.05
Pr(SP|a,q) = (1   Pr(LP|a,q))/(q + 1)
Pr(AP|a,q) = 1   Pr(LP|a,q)   Pr(SP|a,q)
In all cases, Pr(SP|a,q),Pr(AP|a,q) and Pr(LP|a,q) are eventually normalized in order to sum to one
Table10 Outcometransitionfunctionfor10-agentenvironments(fortheﬁrstexperimentalsettinginSect.6)
1 or 2-member coal. As in a 5-agent environment
3-member coal. if NMT < 3 then: if NMT = 1 then q = q/3
if NMT = 2 then q = q/2
Pr(LP|a = ,q) = 0
Pr(AP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.06
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Table 10 continued
1 or 2-member coal. As in a 5-agent environment
Pr(AP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.02
Pr(AP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.01
Pr(SP|a,q) = 1   Pr(AP|a,q)
if NMT = 3 then: Pr(LP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.01
Pr(LP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.04
Pr(LP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.05
Pr(SP|a,q) = (1   Pr(LP|a,q))/(q + 1) + penalty
Pr(AP|a,q) = 1   Pr(LP|a,q)   Pr(SP|a,q)
4,5,6 or 7-member coal. if NMT < 3 then: if NMT = 1 then q = q/3
if NMT = 2 then q = q/2
Pr(LP|a = ,q) = 0
Pr(AP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.03
Pr(AP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.05
Pr(AP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.03
Pr(SP|a,q) = 1   Pr(AP|a,q)
if NMT = 3 then: Pr(LP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.01
Pr(LP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.04
Pr(LP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.05
Pr(SP|a,q) = (1   Pr(LP|a,q))/(q + 1) + penalty
Pr(AP|a,q) = 1   Pr(LP|a,q)   Pr(SP|a,q)
8,9 or 10-member coal. if NMT < 3 then: if NMT = 1 then q = q/3
if NMT = 2 then q = q/2
Pr(LP|a = ,q) = 0
Pr(AP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.035
Pr(AP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.05
Pr(AP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.04
Pr(SP|a,q) = 1   Pr(AP|a,q)
if NMT = 3 then: Pr(LP|a = BFS,q) = q   0.01
Pr(LP|a = BFA,q) = q   0.04
Pr(LP|a = BFL,q) = q   0.05
Pr(SP|a,q) = (1   Pr(LP|a,q))/(q + 1) + penalty
Pr(AP|a,q) = 1   Pr(LP|a,q)   Pr(SP|a,q)
In all cases, Pr(SP|a,q),Pr(AP|a,q) and Pr(LP|a,q) are eventually normalized in order to sum to one
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